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Abstract 
This study examines a firm’s excess value based on segment reporting for the firm and 
its peer group.  Firms often operate in industry segments not reported by peers.  When 
such operating segments are reported separately, the assessed covariance between the 
focal firm’s cash flows and those of its peers is reduced.  As a result, I hypothesize that 
a larger difference in reported operating segments between the focal firm and its peer 
group increases the focal firm’s excess value.  Additionally, when a peer group reports 
greater differences in operating segments, the focal firm will benefit from increased 
differentiation between firms in the peer group, also increasing focal firm excess value.  
Using peer groups based on product descriptions from Form 10-K filings, I construct a 
measure of segment reporting differentiation and find evidence consistent with my 
expectations. I also find the effects of reporting differentiating segment are more 
pronounced after an increase in mandatory disclosure precision (ASC 280), suggesting 
possible externalities due to increased mandatory reporting requirements. Overall, 
results are consistent with the idea that higher levels of differentiation by the focal firm 
and by peers reduce correlations between firms, affecting the focal firm’s excess value. 
 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This study examines the effects of segment differentiation on a firm’s excess 
value.
1
  Segment differentiation is defined as the differences in reported segments either 
between the firm and its peers or differences among peers themselves. Excess value 
refers to the difference between the market value of the firm and its implied value.
2
  An 
extensive literature in finance examines how firm operations in multiple, diverse 
industries impacts excess value.
3
  Specifically, research demonstrates firm 
characteristics or data used when estimating excess value lead to differences in firm 
valuation.  Consistent across all research on operational diversity and excess value is (1) 
diversified firms, operating in multiple lines of business, are valued differently than 
their single-segment counter parts and (2) firm characteristics play an important role in 
determining how diversification affects excess value (positively or negatively).  
However, little research examines how differences in segment reporting of the firm and 
its peers affects excess value of the firm. 
Bens and Monahan (2004) examines how the firm’s segment reporting affects its 
own excess value (with no comparison to peer firm reporting); more disaggregated line 
                                                 
1
  I refer to the firm being affected as the “firm” or “focal firm” interchangeably.  Peer firms are groups of 
firms that are similar to or clustered with the focal firm.  I define peers in two ways.  First, peers are 
defined using product market peers based on product descriptions to construct my measure of segment 
reporting differentiation.  Second, peers are defined using three-digit SIC codes to examine the effects 
of peer firms on the focal firm’s excess value. 
2
  I follow Berger and Ofek (1995) in defining excess value.  Excess value compares the actual value of 
the firm based on the market’s price to the implied value of the firm based on the value of its individual 
subsidiaries/segments.  Excess value uses industry multiples for each subsidiary/segment to impute the 
market value of segments.  The sum of estimated subsidiary/segment value is the implied value of the 
firm.  Firms have lower excess value (a discount) if firm excess value is less than the market value.  
Conversely, firms have higher excess value (a premium) if firm excess value exceeds market value. 
3
  SFAS No. 131 (now ASC 280) requires disclosure of operating, often referred to as line of business 
segments, as well as geographic segments.  This paper focuses on operating/line of business segments.  
Thus, segment reporting differentiation refers to difference between reported operating segments of the 
focal firm and its peer group. 
2 
of business segment reporting improves a firm’s excess value.  In this study, I examine 
segment reporting from a different perspective. I examine how the differences in the 
focal firm’s reported segments and its peer firms’ reported segments affect excess 
value. Differentiating segment information provides additional insight by breaking 
down aggregate firm-level performance into more detailed portions of operations that 
are distinct from peers.  As differences in reported segments between the focal firm and 
its peers increase, segment reporting is more valuable to investors in understanding the 
covariance of the firm’s cash flows with peers’ cash flows.  Further, I also examine the 
average level of differentiation within a peer group in determining the impact on the 
focal firms’ excess value; higher levels of differentiation within a peer group will affect 
the assessed covariance within the peer group, also affecting focal firm cash flows.  In 
summary, I investigate the following two research questions: (1) Are differences 
between the focal firm’s reported segments and its peer group’s reported segments 
associated with focal firm excess value?  (2) Is the level of differentiation within a peer 
group associated with focal firm excess value?  I expect larger differences between the 
focal firm and its peers as well as higher levels of differentiation within a peer group 
will improve focal firm excess value. 
Using a large sample of firms from 1996-2011, I provide empirical evidence of 
how segment reporting differentiation affects excess value.  I find that higher segment 
reporting differentiation between the firm and its peers increases focal firm excess 
value.  I also find that higher segment differentiation among peers increases focal firm 
excess value.  Peer firms are identified using product-level data disclosed in annual 10-
3 
K filings.
4
  Hoberg and Phillips (2010a; 2013) create peer groups based on similarity of 
product descriptions in annual 10-K filings. 
Additionally, I examine whether increases in mandatory segment disclosure 
precision create reporting externalities.  Ettredge et al. (2006) find the correlation 
between segments of multi-segment firms decreases after ASC 280 implementation, 
suggesting firms report segments in more detail.  Ettredge et al. do not examine how a 
change in mandatory disclosure requirements affects focal firm value.  I find evidence 
that increases in mandatory disclosure create reporting externalities for peer firms. 
Examining the role of segment differentiation on excess value is important for four 
reasons.  First, segment reporting as outlined in ASC 280 (previously SFAS No. 131) 
remains an area of SEC scrutiny and a topic of debate.  Trade publications note segment 
reporting is one of the highest areas for which firms receive SEC comment letters 
(Deloitte 2013, PricewaterhouseCoopers 2013, 2014b, a).  The majority of SEC staff 
comments relate to how segments are aggregated when reported externally.  A recent 
Post-Implementation Review of ASC 280 by the Financial Accounting Foundation 
(hereafter FAF) states the current standard has improved segment reporting on average 
but may also allow latitude for firms to aggregate segments when reported outside the 
firm (FAF 2012).  Research using plant-level data affirms this supposition; Bens, 
Berger, and Monahan (2011) find firms with multiple segments aggregate reported 
segments to limit stakeholders’ monitoring ability and to maintain competitive 
advantages.  Little research examines how differentiating segments firms affect firm 
                                                 
4
 I choose to focus on peer firms’ core operations due to potential noise caused by segments not common 
among the peer group.  As discussed later, I specify that at least 5 percent of peer firms must disclose 
an industry code to be included in the core peer operations portfolio.  This choice eliminates industry 
codes that are primarily disclosed by only one firm, often a small portion of total peer firm operations.  
Varying the cutoff point from no cutoff to 25 percent or above does not impact the results of this study. 
4 
value.  This study provides evidence that higher focal firm segment differentiation 
results in higher focal firm excess value. 
Second, while several studies examine effects of focal firm segment reporting, 
limited evidence exists on the role of peer firm segment reporting.  Theoretical evidence 
suggests more precise segment information reduces the perceived systematic correlation 
between firms’ cash flows, reducing the unconditional covariance between focal firm 
and peer firm segments (Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007, Lambert, Leuz, and 
Verrecchia 2012).  Increased differentiation between the focal firm and its peer group 
will result in higher focal firm excess value.  Further, Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 
(2007) also suggest the average level of information precision within a peer group will 
also help investors better evaluate future cash flows of the focal firm’s segments, 
improving focal firm value.  A peer group’s average level of segment differentiation 
will result in higher focal firm excess value.  I test these assertions empirically.  
 Third, understanding the role of peer segment reporting in focal firm valuation is 
important to standard setters evaluating the possibility of altering mandatory disclosure 
requirements.  The Post Implementation Review (FAF 2012) suggests that while ASC 
280 is meeting goals proposed by standard setters, there is room for improvement.  
Except for potential competitive harm due to additional disclosure, little discussion 
references the importance of peer firm segment disclosure.  Research examining ASC 
280 suggests increases in mandatory segment reporting requirements for the focal firm 
improve segment reporting informativeness (e.g., Ettredge et al. 2005, Ettredge et al. 
2006) and limits managerial ability to aggregate segments (e.g., Berger and Hann 2003, 
Berger and Hann 2007, Botosan and Stanford 2005); but this research does not address 
5 
the role of peer firm segment reporting in evaluating the focal firm.  Examining the 
effects of peer firm segment reporting informs financial statement stakeholders of 
possible externalities in segment reporting.  I address issues of externalities in segment 
reporting in this study. 
 Finally, research examining the effects of peer firm financial reporting quality 
on the focal firm has largely focused on firm-level disclosures, such as accrual quality 
(Ma 2013), perceptions of the firm (Welch 2014) or internal control weaknesses 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009, Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan 2007).  
Segment reporting breaks up firm-level disclosures into more precise, detailed portions 
of operations.  Because diversified firms are constructed of less than perfectly 
correlated lines of business, the manner in which segment operations are reported 
externally becomes important when evaluating future cash flows.  Segment disclosures 
provide different signals about firm prospects that aggregate, firm-level disclosures 
cannot (i.e., Arya, Frimor, and Mittendorf 2010, Chen and Zhang 2003).  Given the 
nature of reported segments, I capture information specific to operations directly 
reducing perceived correlation between firms within a peer group.  This reduced 
correlation is expected to improve firm value (Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007). 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of diversification in 
determining firm value, the role of accounting information in determining firm value, 
and the effects of peer firm reporting.  Section 3 develops hypotheses.  Section 4 
outlines the research design for empirical analyses.  Section 5 provides robustness tests 
and additional tests.  Section 6 concludes. 
  
6 
Chapter 2: Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Finance and accounting research provides contradictory predictions for the role 
of segment reporting differentiation in determining excess value.  I discuss each in turn. 
Finance Research and Focal Firm Excess Value 
Early finance theory predicted firm diversification does not affect value because 
individual investors can diversify their own portfolios (Samuelson 1967).  In practice, 
however, capital market imperfections create possibilities for firms to enhance or 
destroy value through diversification strategies.
5
  Initial empirical evidence indicates 
diversified firms receive a significant discount in value (Lang and Stulz 1994, Berger 
and Ofek 1995).  Results demonstrating value-destroying diversification are present 
across countries (Lins and Servaes 1999, Lins and Servaes 2002, Denis, Denis, and 
Yost 2002, Lang et al. 1999), across time (Servaes 1996, Klein 2001, Hoechle et al. 
2012), and when adjusting for accounting methods used at the time of acquisition 
(Custodio 2014).  This evidence suggests firms revealing additional diversification in 
the form of differentiating segments will have a lower excess value than firms that do 
not disclose differentiating segments.  Conversely, another stream of finance research 
asserts the apparent diversification discount is a product of using data other than 
Compustat (Villalonga 2004a, b, Maksimovic and Phillips 2002, Schoar 2002) or 
making various adjustments when estimating implied value (Hund, Monk, and Tice 
2010).  Given that I use the methodology developed by Berger and Ofek, finance 
research would predict firms that disclose differentiating segments will be valued lower 
because firms with greater operational diversity will have lower excess value. 
                                                 
5
  See Martin and Sayrak (2003) and Erdorf et al. (2013) for extensive reviews of diversification and 
excess value. 
7 
Focal Firm Segment Differentiation and Excess Value 
Focal Firm Segment Reporting and Firm Value 
Accounting information plays an important role in evaluating the firm (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986), possibly mitigating the diversification discount (Bens and Monahan 
2004).  Disaggregated segments provide additional information beyond the firm level, 
such as earnings, that may improve focal firm valuation and reduce the diversification 
discount (i.e.,Chen and Zhang 2003, Ettredge et al. 2005, Bens and Monahan 2004, 
Ettredge et al. 2006). 
Analytical models suggest reporting more operational diversity in segments will 
improve focal firm value.  Segments provide more precise information only when 
segment reports demonstrate the firm’s operational diversity (Chen and Zhang 2003).  
Also, firms report more precise segments to verify good investment choices and signal 
firm quality (Kanodia and Lee 1998).  Managers will differentiate themselves from 
poorly performing firms by providing precise segment information in the form of 
differentiating segments (i.e., segments disclosed by the focal firm but not peers).  
Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) suggest more precise disclosures improve 
estimation of future cash flow, which in turn improves focal firm excess value.  
Therefore, firms reporting differentiating segments will reduce the unconditional 
covariance between the focal firm and its peers, improving future cash flow estimation, 
also improving focal firm excess value. 
Limited empirical evidence exists with respect to the role of segment 
differentiation in firm value.  Existent research demonstrates firms benefit when more 
precise, disaggregated segment information is reported.  Higher quality segment 
8 
reporting increases the market’s ability to reduce agency costs through monitoring 
(Berger and Hann 2003), to reduce information asymmetries (Greenstein and Sami 
1994, Hope, Thomas, and Winterbotham 2009), to limit overinvestment (Hope and 
Thomas 2008), and to uncover cross-subsidization of poor performing segments (Berger 
and Hann 2007).  More precise segment disclosures also provide information 
incremental to overall financial reporting quality that increases the firm’s excess value 
(Bens and Monahan 2004) and improves the market’s ability to predict earnings 
(Ettredge et al. 2005).  Overall, these results demonstrate more precise segment 
information improves focal firm value, suggesting higher levels of differentiating 
segments may also improve focal firm value.  None of these studies measures reporting 
differences between the focal firm and its peers. 
Focal Firm Segment Differentiation and Excess Value 
Finance research finds disclosure of a greater number of diverse segments will 
result in lower focal firm excess value (Berger and Ofek 1995).  But, accounting 
research shows more disaggregated segment reporting improves excess value, reducing 
the diversification discount (Bens and Monahan 2004).  Further, Lambert, Leuz, and 
Verrecchia (2007) suggest more precise information reduces the unconditional 
covariance between firms, improving firm value.  Thus, I expect firms that report more 
segments that differentiate the focal firm from its peers will have higher excess value. 
H1a: Higher levels of segment differentiation between the focal firm and its 
peers will increase focal firm excess value. 
  
9 
Peer Firm Segment Differentiation and Excess Value 
Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) demonstrate how the quality (or 
precision) of accounting disclosure affects a firm’s cost of capital in a multi-firm 
setting.  Using CAPM, Lambert et al. assert more precise accounting information 
affects not only the focal firm by reducing the variance of the focal firm’s expected 
future cash flows but also peer firms by reducing the assessed covariance of the focal 
firm’s cash flows with correlated peers.6  Effects of more precise accounting disclosure 
are undiversifiable in a multi-firm setting because of changes in the systematic 
correlation.
7
  In the present context, firms that disclose differentiating segments reduce 
not only the variance of focal firm cash flow estimation but also the perceived 
correlation between the focal firm and its peers, improving future cash flow estimation.  
Extended to a peer group, firms disclosing differentiating segments will affect all 
members of the peer group, not only the firm disclosing the differentiating segment.  
                                                 
6
  Effects of peer groups on the focal firm are well established in finance and accounting.  Finance 
research demonstrates peer stocks move in tandem (King 1966, Roll 1992, Lessard 1974, Grinold, 
Rudd, and Stefek 1989) and that comovement can be attributed to information transfer from one stock 
to another, (Foster 1981, Baginski 1987, Clinch and Sinclair 1987, Han, Wild, and Ramesh 1989, Han 
and Wild 1990, Freeman and Tse 1992).  Other researchers examine the effects of industry specific 
events (Bowen, Castanias, and Daley 1983, Sidak 2003) on industry peers, showing the event affected 
all peers within the industry group.  Research examining accounting restatements demonstrates 
investors reevaluate their investments and make adjustments after a peers’ restatement (Xu, Najand, 
and Ziegenfuss 2006, Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson 2008, Durnev and Mangen 2009, Kravet and 
Shevlin 2010).  Industry and audit peers of the focal firm are valued at a discount after the restatement, 
likely due to short-term earnings projection revisions (Xu, Najand, and Ziegenfuss 2006, Gleason, 
Jenkins, and Johnson 2008).  Thus, research suggests investors are continually revising expectations 
using available information to create expectations. 
7
  If the focal firm’s cash flows are measured with error and correlated with other firms, then the effect of 
peers’ disclosure is not diversifiable.  When information from peers is released, the market receives 
new information about the measurement error and/or future cash flows of the correlated focal firm.  If 
there is no noise then cash flow disclosures are fully informative and there is no need for peers.  If 
noise is infinite then all peer disclosures provide information about the focal firm.  Additional 
information from peers reduces the unconditional covariance between correlated firms, which in turn 
reduces the focal firm’s cost of capital. 
10 
The result is lower estimation risk, improved future cash flow estimation, a lower cost 
of capital, and therefore improved excess value.
8
 
Two studies examine the effects of peer accounting information quality on firm 
valuation.  Welch (2014) examines the effects of fair value reporting on private equity 
firms’ ability to raise funds.  Private equity firm peers with better fair value reporting 
expose previously unknown correlation across private equity firms, decreasing the 
amount of capital the focal firm can raise.  In other words, higher fair value reporting by 
one firm changes the market’s perception of its peers, reducing the ability the focal 
firm’s peers to raise capital.  Ma (2013) tests effects of accrual quality of the focal and 
peer firms on the focal firm’s cost of equity capital.  Ma shows not only the focal firm’s 
accrual quality but also peer firm accrual quality plays an important role in determining 
the focal firm’s cost of equity capital.  I extend Ma by examining the role of segment 
information.  Specifically, differences in reported segment among peers may be 
important when valuing the focal firm.  Consistent with Lambert et al., I expect higher 
peer firm segment reporting differentiation will reduce the focal firm’s covariance with 
peer firms, increasing focal firm value. 
H1b: Higher levels of segment differentiation among the focal firm’s peer group 
will increase focal firm excess value. 
  
                                                 
8
  Lambert et al. suggest the effects of information quality on cost of capital are both direct through 
revision in market participants’ assessment of the cash flow distribution and indirect through real 
decisions made by a firm that in turn affect the expected value and covariance of future cash flows.  I 
test the valuation implications of their model, not the effects of increased disclosure on real decisions. 
11 
Increases in Mandatory Disclosure and Externalities 
Mandatory disclosure arises from management’s inability to integrate the full cost 
of disclosure into the voluntary disclosure decision-making process (Akerlof 1970, 
Admati and Pfleiderer 2000, Leuz and Wysocki 2008).  Rational managers only weigh 
costs and benefits directly affecting the firm, excluding social costs and benefits 
generated from externalities of disclosure (Coase 1960).  Fischer and Verrecchia (2004) 
and Arya, Frimor, and Mittendorf (2010) predict diversified firms will aggregate 
reported segments as much as possible to keep from differentiating low investment 
outcomes from high investment outcomes.  Segment aggregation inhibits monitoring 
and protects competitive advantages and was the result of lower quality mandatory 
reporting requirements, SFAS No. 14 (Berger and Hann 2003, Berger and Hann 2007, 
Botosan and Stanford 2005).  Thus, more precise segment disclosure is under produced 
in the absence of mandatory disclosure requirements. 
Prior to implementation of SFAS No. 131 (now ASC 280), managers disclosed 
limited segment information.  Known as the industry approach, SFAS No. 14 required 
any segment over 10 percent of total sales or assets to be reported as an individual 
segment.  Under SFAS No. 14, managers overly aggregated segments, hiding segments 
later reported under ASC 280.  Research indicates the level of segment reporting 
precision (Herrmann and Thomas 2000, Street, Nichols, and Gray 2000) and 
informativeness (Ettredge et al. 2005, Ettredge et al. 2006) increased after ASC 280 
implementation.   No study has yet to examine potential externalities created by 
mandatory segment reporting requirements. 
12 
Critics of SFAS No. 14 cite low segment disclosure precision and poor segment 
transparency as reasons for increased mandatory disclosure enacted by ASC 280 (e.g., 
Herrmann and Thomas 2000, Street, Nichols, and Gray 2000).  While segment reporting 
has improved on average (Ettredge et al. 2005, Botosan and Stanford 2005, Berger and 
Hann 2003, Berger and Hann 2007, Ettredge et al. 2006), recent research and the Post-
Implementation Review suggest some firms still aggregate segments beyond 
recommendations in ASC 280, impairing segment reporting informativeness (Bens, 
Berger, and Monahan 2011, FAF 2012).  Research has yet to examine possible 
externalities created by peer firm segment reporting due to increased mandatory 
segment disclosure that may not necessitate increased segment disclosure by the focal 
firm, one possible reason for mandating accounting disclosure (Lambert, Leuz, and 
Verrecchia 2007). 
If changes in mandatory requirements improved the precision and 
informativeness of segment reports, all firms may benefit from increased disclosure, 
reducing the perceived covariance between firms within a peer group.  Firms and peer 
groups reporting differentiating segments will receive an additional benefit from the 
differentiating segment information, reducing covariances between firms even more 
after ASC 280.  Thus, reporting differentiating segments may have a larger effect after 
ASC 280 implementation for both the focal firm and the average level of peer firm 
differentiation.  Lambert et al. (2007) predicts a larger positive effect due to increased 
mandatory disclosure precision. 
Conversely, the increase in mandatory disclosure precision may increase 
disclosure of less profitable, value destroying segments previously unreported (Berger 
13 
and Hann 2003, Berger and Hann 2007).  If the increase in differentiation around the 
standard change is due to additional disclosure of less profitable segments, peer firms 
will receive an additional decrease in value due to peer firm information.  This effect 
may subsume the prediction of reduced covariance among peer firms predicted by 
Lambert et al.  Given predictions in opposing directions, I state my hypotheses 
nondirectionally. 
H2a: The impact of focal firm segment differentiation on focal firm excess 
value is affected by ASC 280 implementation. 
H2b: The impact of peer firm segment differentiation on focal firm excess value 
is affected by ASC 280 implementation. 
  
14 
Chapter 3: Data and Research Design 
In this section I describe data sources used in empirical analysis.  I describe how 
my segment reporting differentiation measure is constructed from publicly available 
data (Hoberg and Phillips 2010a, 2013) and the Compustat Segment file.  I conclude 
this section by discussing models used to test my hypotheses.  
Data and Sample Selection 
Data in this study come from publicly available sources.  Data for product 
market peers based on product descriptions come from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a, 
2013).
9
  These data are constructed using all available financial statements available on 
the SEC’s EDGAR website.  The current version of the data covers financial statements 
from 1996-2011 for 12,187 different firms.
10
  All other data are obtained from 
Compustat and CRSP.  Firms in the sample must have sufficient information to 
calculate control variables and variables of interests.  Firms with segments in the 
financial sector (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) are eliminated.
11
  Total segment sales must be 
within 1 percent of total firm sales and firms must have more than $20 million in total 
sales.  The combination of data from Hoberg and Phillips, Compustat, CRSP, and 
control variables yields 29,137 (4,725) firm-year (firm) observations.  Of those 
observations, 16,620 are single segment firms-years and 12,517 are multi-segment firm-
                                                 
9
 http://alex2.umd.edu/industrydata/industryclass.htm Last downloaded on March 24, 2014, the most 
recent update.  As of January 18, 2015 there have been no updates. 
10
 The period covered by Hoberg and Phillips (2010a; 2013) determines the sample period for my tests. 
11
 Firms in the financial sector (SIC 6000 to 6999) are excluded due to additional disclosure regulation 
and previous research design choice when determining excess value (Berger and Ofek 1995) 
15 
years.  Of the 4,725 firms, 3,561 are single segment firms throughout the sample period, 
and 2,470 are multi-segment firms at some point during the sample period.
12
 
Measure of Segment Differentiation 
My measure of segment differentiation focuses on segments reported by the firm 
and by its peers.
13
  I use product descriptions from Form 10-K filings obtained from 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010a; 2013) to identify product market peers.  Hoberg and 
Phillips extract product descriptions from annual Form 10-K filings to create groups of 
peers based on the similarity of product descriptions.  These groups are referred to as 
product market competitors or Text-Based Network Industry Classification (hereafter 
TNIC) peers.
14
  TNIC peers cluster firms into local area networks by products.  This 
clustering is like the grouping of colleagues in a department of a college or like a circle 
of friends in a social networking group.  TNIC peers share similar product 
descriptions/product characteristics.  Firms in TNIC groups often share several products 
in common.  Thus, if the focal firm does not share an industry code with its peer group, 
it is most likely that the segment in which it operates differentiates the focal firm from 
its peers. 
                                                 
12
 The sum of single-segment and multi-segment firms exceeds the total number of Compustat firms 
because the lists are not mutually exclusive.  A single-segment firm can expand to become a multi-
segment firm or vice versa.  
13
 Three approaches to determine segment reporting quality currently exist.  First, researchers estimate a 
firm’s operational diversity from plant-level data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau (i.e., Bens, 
Berger, and Monahan 2011).  Second, researchers use data from a source that has verified a firm’s 
operations in more detail than segments reported in financial statements—such as the Standard & 
Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives (Bens and Monahan 2004, Piotroski 2003).  
Finally, researchers take segment reports as given, examining the quality of reported information using 
the number of items reported in above mandatory requirements (Blanco Peláez, García Lara, and Tribó 
Giné 2013, 2010) or rating the quality of reported segment information (Saini 2010, Saini and 
Herrmann 2011).  While my measure is not directly measuring segment reporting quality, more precise, 
differentiating segments can be thought of as a form of segment reporting quality. 
14
 TNIC refers to the fact that industry classifications are determined using textual analysis of product 
descriptions. 
16 
My measure of segment differentiation, DIFF, measures the difference between 
focal firm’s reported segments and the core operations of its peer group.  DIFF is 
measured as the percentage segment sales of the focal firm not disclosed by the peer 
group.  DIFF is estimated in three steps.
15
  First, I identify all segment SIC codes 
disclosed by at least five percent of TNIC peers.
16, 17
 Consider a simplified example. 
Suppose Firm A has TNIC peers X, Y, and Z as identified by Hoberg and Phillips.  
Compustat reports that Firm X operates in SIC industry 2; Firm Y operates in SIC 
industries 2 and 3; and Firm Z operates in SIC industries 2 and 4.  The core peer 
operations portfolio based on TNIC peers X, Y, and Z would be SIC industries 2, 3, and 
4 (see Figure 2).  
Second, I compare the focal firm’s segment SIC industry codes with the peer SIC 
codes.  If a segment SIC of the focal firm matches a peer SIC code, the focal firm’s 
segment is considered common (i.e., no differentiation).  If the focal firm’s segment 
SIC code does not match a peer SIC code, the segment differentiates the focal firm from 
its peers.  Continuing with the previous example, if Firm A discloses segments in SIC 
industries 1 and 2, only segment 1 is included in DIFF.  Segment 1 differentiates the 
focal firm from its peers. Segment 2 is reported by (at least five percent of) its peers. 
                                                 
15
 To see a full description of the procedure used to derive my measure of segment reporting 
differentiation with a detailed example, please refer to Appendix A.   
16
 TNIC peer SIC codes are obtained from the Compustat Segment file.  To be included in the peer 
portfolio at least five percent of firms must disclose the same SIC code.  This cutoff is made to identify 
core peer firm operations.  Results are the same if this cutoff is not made or the level of similarity 
between peers is varied below or above 5 percent. 
17
 Research has not agreed on how industries should be defined.  Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003) provide a 
comparison of industry classification systems, concluding that GICS codes performed as well if not 
better than SIC, NAICS, or Fama-French 48 industry classifications.  But, GICS codes are not widely 
available for all firm-years.  SIC codes are most widely adopted.  Research using plant-level data uses 
four-digit SIC codes (Bens, Berger, and Monahan 2011) while most other research uses two or three-
digit SIC codes.  Also, Hoberg and Phillips (2010a; 2013) state the granularity of their data is similar to 
that of three-digit SIC codes.  I use four-digit SIC codes to capture the breadth of focal firm operations 
but define the peer firm measure at the three-digit SIC code level to avoid issues of granularity. 
17 
Third, I divide the sum of sales from focal firm differentiating segments by total 
sales of the focal firm.  From the example above, if segment 1 of Firm A has $35 
million in sales, and firm A has total sales of $100 million, DIFF will be thirty-five 
percent ($35 million divided by $100 million). 
𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚
 (1) 
Higher levels of DIFF indicate the focal firm is reporting a larger portion of 
differentiating sales in its segments.  Focal firm segment reporting differentiation 
(FFDIFF) is the natural log of one plus DIFF. 
𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 =  𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹) (2) 
To measure the impact of peer firm differentiation (PFDIFF) on the focal firm, I 
calculate the market value-weighted average of peer firms’ DIFF.  I define peer groups 
when calculating the value-weighted DIFF using three-digit SIC codes.
18,19
  Higher 
PFDIFF indicates the three-digit SIC code group reports higher levels of differentiating 
segments. 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 = 𝑙𝑛 (1 + ∑
𝑀𝑉𝑝
𝑀𝑉
𝑛
𝑝=1
∗ 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑝) (3) 
 
  
                                                 
18
 If peers are defined at the four-digit SIC code level issues of colinearity arise.  Also, defining peer 
groups at the four-digit level increases the probability that an SIC code group contains only a few peers.  
Thus, I define peer groups at the three-digit level.  The results remain unchanged if peers are defined at 
any level of SIC codes. 
19
 Equal-weighting treats all observations in a given industry-year equally.  This does not take into 
account how the size of a given firm in an industry-year may affect the median or mean value 
disproportionately.  Equal-weighting can overweight smaller firms and underweight large firms.  
Value-weighting considers the market or book value of the firm when determining the median or mean 
value.  Value-weighting accounts for the disproportionate effect of larger firms on aggregate industry 
outcomes. Results are robust to equal-weighting DIFF. 
18 
Where: 
𝑀𝑉𝑝 = The market value of peer firm p 
𝑀𝑉 = Total market value of the industry defined by three-digit SIC 
codes 
𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑝 = The measure DIFF for peer firm p 
n = Number of three-digit SIC code peers 
 Continuing with the previous example, each firm within the peer group will 
have FFDIFF and PFDIFF in turn.  That is to say that Firm X will be compared to 
Firms A, Y, and Z.  Firm X has no differentiating segments and receives a DIFF equal 
to zero.  Firm Y differentiates itself from its peers by reporting segment 3.  DIFF for 
firm Y equals the percentage of sales reported for segment 3.  Firm Z differentiates 
itself from its peers by reporting segment 4.  DIFF for firm Z equals the percentage of 
sales reported for segment 4.  PFDIFF for firm A is the market value-weighted average 
of DIFF for firms X, Y, and Z. 
Measure of Excess Value of Diversification 
I use the methodology developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) to calculate excess 
value with data from the Compustat Segment file.  Excess value captures the difference 
between the market value of the firm and the implied/estimated value of the firm based 
on the valuation of its individual segments.  Implied value is estimated using the “chop 
shop” approach: estimating the value for each individual segment as if it were being 
purchased from the market separately using an industry multiplier, then adding up the 
value of all individual parts.  By comparing the market value to the implied value, we 
gain insight into the market’s valuation of the combined segment portfolio of a multi-
segment firm relative to purchasing a similar portfolio of segments on the market.  
19 
Firms with market values less than the implied value are valued at a discount, referred 
to as a diversification discount.  Firms with market values greater than the implied value 
are valued at a premium, referred to as a diversification premium. 
I make one deviation from Berger and Ofek’s methodology.  Berger and Ofek use 
the median industry multiplier to estimate the value of each segment because their 
research question asks if multi-segment firms are valued at a discount, or the distance 
from zero of the difference between the market and implied values.  Median values are 
more appropriate for their research question due to outliers or a skewed distribution of 
ExVal.  Any values less than −1.386 or greater than 1.386 are removed to limit the 
influence of extreme outliers (Berger and Ofek 1995, Bens and Monahan 2004).
20
  After 
comparing median and mean multipliers, I find mean industry multipliers to be better 
suited for my research question.
21
  I estimate excess value, ExVal, using the implied 
value, 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙, as follows: 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙 = ∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
× [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖(
𝑉𝑎𝑙
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚⁄ )𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
] 
(4) 
Where: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖 = Accounting item of interest, such as sales or assets, for 
segment i 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖(
𝑉𝑎𝑙
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚⁄ )𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
 = The multiple of firm value to the accounting item of 
interest for the mean single-segment firm in segment i's 
industry 
𝑉𝑎𝑙 = Actual firm value at the end of the fiscal year defined as 
the sum of equity market value and book value of debt 
𝑛 = The total number of segments reported by the firm in 
the Form 10-K filings 
                                                 
20
 Berger and Ofek (1995) chose 1.386 and -1.386 as cutoff points because actual values above or below 
these thresholds are less than four times or one-fourth the imputed value, respectively. 
21
 Using median industry multipliers provides similar results. 
20 
For each segment, the estimated value is the product of the mean industry multiplier, 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖(
𝑉𝑎𝑙
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚⁄ )𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
, and the accounting item of interest, segment sales or assets.  
Industries are defined for each segment as the narrowest SIC grouping with at least five 
single-segment firms, sales of $20 million, and sufficient data to calculate the valuation 
multiple.  Industries are defined first by four-digit SIC codes if five or more single-
segment firms with the same four-digit SIC code as the segment of interest have 
sufficient data and meet size requirements.  If a segment-industry does not occur at the 
four-digit SIC code, the industry is defined by three-digit SIC code, then two-digit SIC 
code.
22
  All firms from financial services industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) are 
excluded. 
The ratio of actual value to imputed value is used to determine excess value of 
the firm by calculating the following ratio: 
𝐸𝑥𝑉𝑎𝑙 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑉𝑎𝑙
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙
) 
(5) 
Firms for which the sum of segment sales is not within one percent of total sales are 
excluded.  Firms with segment assets that deviate more than 25 percent are also 
excluded.
23
  In regression analysis, ExVal takes one of two values, ExValRev or ExValAT.  
ExValRev uses segment sales as AccItemi where ExValAT uses segment assets as the 
accounting item of interest. 
                                                 
22
 Berger and Ofek as well as others using their methodology have found all segments are defined at the 
two-digit SIC code level, as is the case in this study  This makes defining industries by single-digit SIC 
code unnecessary. 
23
 Firms often have a large amount of corporate assets that are unallocated to segments.  Enacting a 
threshold of one percent, similar to the sales threshold, would exclude firms with corporate assets not 
allocated to operating segments.  Thus, the higher threshold of 25 percent of assets is chosen. 
21 
Tests of Segment Reporting Differentiation and Excess Value 
Segment Reporting Differentiation and Excess Value 
I use the model from Bens and Monahan (2004) to test H1a and H1b, the effects of 
segment differentiation on excess value, adding controls related to TNIC peers.  I 
estimate the following regression, clustered by firm and year: 
𝐸𝑥𝑉𝑎𝑙 = 𝛼0 + 𝜶𝟏𝑭𝑭𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑭 + 𝜶𝟐𝑷𝑭𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑭 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑒𝑔 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 
+𝛼5𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑃𝑟𝑠+𝛼6𝐻𝐻𝐼 + ∑ 𝛼𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑐
9
𝑐=1
+ 𝜀 
 
(6) 
ExVal, FFDIFF, and PFDIFF are defined previously.  The coefficients of interest are 
𝛼1 and 𝛼2.  H1a predicts that as the difference between the focal firm and its peers 
increases, the unconditional correlation between the focal firm and its peers will 
decrease, increasing focal firm excess value; therefore 𝛼1 will be positive.  H1b predicts 
that as the average level of segment reporting differences increases across the peer 
group, the focal firm will experience reduced systematic correlation, increasing focal 
firm excess value; thus 𝛼2 will be positive.  
I include the number of TNIC peer firms, NumTNICPrs, and a Herfindahl index, 
HHI, provided by Hoberg and Phillips (2010b) to control for the number of possible 
SIC codes and for competition that may drive disclosure aggregation decisions, 
respectively.
24
 
The remaining controls follow Bens and Monahan (2004) and are designed to 
capture the complexity of the focal firm, its information environment, and firm 
                                                 
24
 I use an HHI index provided by Hoberg and Phillips (2010b) because using an HHI index based on 
Compustat data alone can lead to incorrect conclusions (Ali, Klasa, and Yeung 2009).  Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010b) have estimated HHIs using publically and privately available information.  Compustat 
is limited to publicly trade firms, omitting private firms, a large portion of competition in many 
markets. 
22 
characteristics that affect value.  NumSeg is the number of segments reported by the 
focal firm.  Related captures the relatedness of the firm’s operations and is measured as 
the total number of reported segments less the number of unique three-digit SIC codes 
from reported segments.  As discussed previously, finance research has found firms 
receive either a discount or a premium for diversification, based on firm characteristics 
or the data source.  Adding these controls holds constant factors that affect excess value 
due to diversification and not segment reporting.  Firm size, labeled Size, relates to 
many factors that capture the focal firm’s information environment (i.e., Lang and 
Lundholm 1996) and is defined as the natural log of total assets.  Profit is defined as the 
return on assets and captures excess value related to firm performance. Invest is defined 
as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. 
I also control for firm characteristics related to value.
25
  Leverage measures firm 
indebtedness and is defined as the book value of debt, long and short-term, divided by 
total assets. SalesGrow captures the current growth of the firm and is measured as the 
sales in the current period divided by sales in the previous period. MAR captures the 
stock market performance of the firm over the current year and is measured as one plus 
the market-adjusted stock return for the fiscal year. StdROE measures the volatility of 
the firm’s past performance and is computed as the standard deviation of return on 
equity over the past five years. Corr5yr measures the correlation between the annual 
stock return and earnings per share.  Corr5yr is defined as the correlation between the 
                                                 
25
 Bens and Monahan also include several variables describing analysts’ evaluation of the firm: analyst 
forecasts, the average monthly following, forecast error, forecast dispersion, and the standard deviation 
of changes over the fiscal year in the median forecast from the preceding month.  I exclude these 
variables for two reasons.  First, one measure of their study uses AMIR scores which are more closely 
related to analyst forecast, and second, using I/B/E/S data places additional restrictions on data by 
limiting the number of matches.  Analyst control variables in the study have limited explanatory power 
in most cases. 
23 
annual stock return and earnings per share computed over the preceding five years.  
Finally, Surprise captures additional information from current earnings and is measured 
as the absolute value of the difference between current-year earnings per share and 
previous-year earnings per share, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. 
Changes in Mandatory Disclosure and Excess Value 
The change in accounting standard provides an opportunity to test H2a and H2b.  
Low mandatory segment reporting quality occurred pre-ASC 280; high mandatory 
segment reporting quality occurs after ASC 280 implementation.  Post is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm-year observation is after ASC 280 implementation, all 
firm-year observations after December 1998, and zero otherwise.
26
  I estimate the 
following equation, clustering by firm and year: 
𝐸𝑥𝑉𝑎𝑙 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 + 𝜷𝟑𝑭𝑭𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑭 × 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 
+𝜷𝟓𝑷𝑭𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑭 × 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕 + 𝛽6𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 
+𝛽8𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑃 + 𝛽9𝐻𝐻𝐼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑐
9
𝑐=1
+ 𝜉 
 
(7) 
H2a poses whether higher mandatory disclosure affects the impact of focal firm 
differentiation on the focal firm’s excess value; H2b poses whether higher mandatory 
disclosure affects the impact of peer firm differentiation on the focal firm’s excess 
value.  The coefficients of interest are 𝛽3 and 𝛽5.  Coefficients can be either negative or 
positive depending on whether higher-quality mandatory segment disclosures created 
positive or negative externalities. 
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 The change in standard occurred for firms filing in December 1998.  If a firm filed their annual return 
in November 1998 they would report segments under SFAS No. 14 unless voluntarily choosing to 
report under ASC 280.  I assume all firms disclosing prior to December 1998 report under SFAS No. 
14 and firms disclosing after December 1, 1998 disclose using ASC 280. 
24 
Chapter 4: Descriptive Statistics and Results 
In this section I provide descriptive statistics for my sample, correlations 
between variables in equations (6), and estimation of equations (6) and (7).  I provide 
statistics for both single segment and multi-segment firms. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides the industry composition for single and multi-segment firms.
27
  
No one industry dominates the sample and the mix of firm and firm-year observations is 
mostly homogenous across single and multi-segment samples.  Only business services 
comprise a larger portion of the sample for both single and multi-segment firms, 13.27 
percent and 12.82 percent of firm-year observations, respectively.  Retail (10.10 
percent) and Electronic Equipment (10.79 percent) also comprise larger relative 
portions of the sample for single segment firms. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for single and multi-segment firms.  
Descriptive statistics for ExValRev and ExValAT are generally consistent with previous 
research.
28
   Given that I use mean industry multiplier, I find ExValRev and ExValAT are 
lower than median values, untabulated.   My research question does not make 
inferences on the proximity of ExVal to zero as does previous research establishing the 
diversification discount; therefore, lower mean values will not impact my results.  
Overall, descriptive statistics demonstrate ExVal is different for single and multi-
segment firms with multi-segment firms generally receiving lower excess value. 
                                                 
27
 Industry groups are presented using Fama-French 48 industry classifications for ease of presentation.  
SIC codes are used in analysis. 
28
 As previously noted, I make one deviation from Berger and Ofek.  I use mean industry multipliers 
instead of median industry multipliers (discussed in detail previously).  In separate analysis, results are 
consistent when using median industry multipliers.  Results for mean industry multipliers are not 
reported by Berger and Ofek for comparison. 
25 
My measure of segment reporting differentiation suggests firms report a large 
portion of sales not disclosed by peer firms.  To ease interpretation of my measures I 
include descriptive statistics for DIFFFF and DIFFPF, before the log transformation used 
in regressions labeled FFDIFF and PFDIFF.
29
  For multi-segment firms, the mean 
(median) percent of segment sales not disclosed by peer firms is 37 percent (16 
percent).  DIFFFF for single segment firms indicates the focal firm does not operate in 
the same four-digit SIC code as their product market peers 25 percent of the time.
30
  For 
multi-segment firms, the mean (median) value-weighted peer firm differentiation, 
DIFFPF, is 20 percent (9 percent).  Single segment firms have peers with more similar 
segments; mean (median) value-weighted DIFFPF is 15 percent (6 percent). 
 Multi-segment firms are on average larger than single segment firms with mean 
(median) assets of 2,927.75 (610.14) for multi-segment firms versus 1,214.17 (234.00) 
for single segment firms.  Multi-segment firms have less product market peers with a 
mean (median) of 46 competitors (23 competitors) than single segment firms with a 
mean (median) 75 competitors (42 competitors).  As previous studies demonstrate, firm 
performance as measured by ROA and PM does not vary significantly between single 
and multi-segment firms. 
 Table 3 provides correlations between variables in equations (6).  As would be 
expected, FFDIFF and PFDIFF are strongly and positively correlated with ExVal for 
single segment and multi-segment firms. 
                                                 
29
 To reconcile the values listed in descriptive statistics with values used in regressions, the reported value 
is added to one, and then the natural log is taken.  For example, the mean (median) FFDIFF for multi-
segment firms is 0.3148 (0.1484). 
30
 Single segment firms that do not operate in the same four-digit SIC code as product market peers 
operate in SIC codes very similar to product market peers.  In this case, product market peers operate in 
four-digit SIC codes above and/or below the single-segment’s four-digit SIC code. 
26 
Multivariate Analyses of Excess Value and Segment Reporting Differentiation 
Table 4 provides results for estimation of equation (6).  Equation (6) is estimated 
separately for single and multi-segment firms using two-way clustering by firm and 
year.  To address issues related to the standard change from SFAS No. 14 to ASC 280, I 
estimate equation (6) for the full sample from 1996 to 2011 and then for the post 
implementation period, December 1998 to 2011, to hold constant the reporting 
regime.
31
 
Multi-Segment Firm Differentiation 
Table 4 Panel A provides results for multi-segment firms.  The main coefficients 
of interest are FFDIFF and PFDIFF, 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 respectivley.  As predicted by H1a, 
FFDIFF is positive and significant in all cases (at least p-value <0.10).  This result is 
consistent for the full sample and after ASC 280 implementation.  This result is 
economically significant; using regression (3) as a basis for comparison, for ten percent 
change in FFDIFF, there is a 1.1 percent increase in excess value.  While this result 
may not seem large, small percentage changes in differentiation results in large changes 
in dollar values.  Holding constant mean values, a ten percent increase in FFDIFF—
equivalent to reporting an additional 3.7 percent of differentiating segment sales—
increases implied value by roughly $66.54 million when excess value is estimated using 
revenues and $57.40 million when excess value is estimated using assets.
32
 
H1b predicts the average level of segment differentiation within a peer group, 
PFDIFF, will be positive (𝛼2 > 0).  Results for multi-segment firms in panel A are 
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 Estimating equation (6) on the pre-period only also results in similar conclusions. 
32
 Median values provide similar intuition.  For a ten percent increase in focal firm reporting—an increase 
of 1.6 percent of differentiating sales—implied value increases by $10.39 million when revenues are 
used to estimate excess value and $8.80 million when assets are used to estimate excess value. 
27 
positive and significant indicating that peer group differentiation provides information 
associated with higher focal firm excess value (at least p-value < 0.10).  PFDIFF has an 
equally important economic significance.  For a ten percent change in PFDIFF —the 
average level of differentiating segments within a peer group increases by 2 percent—
focal firm excess value is associated with an increase of 1.5 percent for implied value.  
This result indicates an increase by roughly $90.38 million when excess value is 
estimated using revenues and $77.97 million when excess value is estimated using 
assets.
33
  It is important to note that FFDIFF has incremental explanatory power once 
PFDIFF is included in the model, indicating that the focal firm will benefit from 
reporting differentiating segments even though peer firm differentiation exists. Overall, 
these results are consistent with Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007): both focal firm 
and peer firms disclosure precision will positively affect focal firm value. 
It is important to note the coefficients for NumSeg and Related for multi-
segment firms.  These variables hold constant operational diversity of the firm, often 
related to the diversification discount.  Previous literature is mixed on predictions for 
NumSeg and Related.  If diversified firms are valued at a discount, then NumSeg will be 
negative and Related will be positive.  If diversified firms are valued at a premium, 
NumSeg will be positive and Related will be negative.  Table 4 Panel A indicates that 
NumSeg is negative and Related is positive (at least p-values < 0.05), indicating that 
multi-segment firms receive a discount on average.  While reporting differentiating 
segments improves value, it is insufficient to completely overcome the diversification 
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 Median values provide similar intuition.  For a ten percent increase in the average level of segment 
differentiating sales—peer firms reporting 0.9 percent additional differentiating sales on average—
implied value increases by $14.11 million when sales is used to estimate implied value and $11.95 
million when assets is used to estimate excess value. 
28 
discount on average.  Continuing with our previous example from regression (3) of 
table 4, the average firm would increase implied value by $156.92 million if sales are 
used to estimate excess value and $135.37 million if assets are used to estimate excess 
value.  The average difference between market value and implied value for multi-
segment firms is $1,279.29 million if sales are used to estimate excess value and 
$439.24 million if assets are used to estimate excess value.  Thus, the diversification 
discount is reduced but not eliminated.  The remaining variables are consistent with 
previous literature. 
Single Segment Firm Differentiation 
Although single segment firms do not suffer from issues that may create or 
destroy value due to diversification, Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) suggest that 
single-segment firms will benefit from increased disclosure precision.  Thus, single-
segment firms operating in niche areas considerably different from market competitors 
will benefit from differentiating their operations from competitors, reducing covariances 
between itself and its peer group.  Further, single segment firms will also benefit from 
the reduced covariance from higher levels of average peer firm differentiation within 
the peer group. 
Table 4 Panel B provides results for single segment firms.  FFDIFF for single 
segment firms is positively associated with excess value in all cases and highly 
significant (at least p-value < 0.01), suggesting differentiating single segment firms are 
associated with a higher valuation.  This result is also economically significant; a 
single-segment firm that reports with a differentiating SIC code is associated with a 
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$518.42 million increase when revenues are used to estimate excess value and $503.31 
million when assets are used to estimate excess value. 
Similarly, PFDIFF is positive and significant in regressions (at least p-values < 
0.05).  This result is also economically significant.  If the average level of peer firm 
differentiation within the peer group increases by ten percent—an increase of 1.5 
percent in differentiating sales—focal firm excess value is associated with a $26.52 
million increase when sales are used to estimate excess value and a $25.75 million 
increase when assets are used to estimate excess value. 
Multivariate Analyses of Externalities in Segment Reporting 
To test for externalities in segment reporting, I use the standard change from 
SFAS No. 14 to ASC 280.  Given the sample period from the previous test is mostly 
comprised of firm-year observations after ASC 280 implementation, I limit my sample 
to firm-year observations from 1996 to 2001. 
There are three possible reporting groups when examining the change in 
segment reporting: 1) no change in segment reporting for both single and multi-segment 
firms; 2) firms that reported a single segment under SFAS No. 14 and multiple 
segments under ASC 280; and 3) firms that reported multiple segments under SFAS No. 
14 and increased the number of reported segments under ASC 280.  Firms with no 
change in the number of reported segments have constant segment reporting quality 
across the standard change.  Firms reporting a single segment under SFAS No. 14 and 
multiple segments under ASC 280 have been shown to have poor segment reporting 
quality, often hiding poor performing segments (Berger and Hann 2003, Botosan and 
30 
Stanford 2005).  Firms with multiple segments that increased the number of segments 
improve their segment reporting quality. 
To test H2, I create an indicator variable, Post, equal to 1 if the firm-year 
observation is after ASC 280 implementation, zero otherwise.  I interact Post with my 
main variables of interest, FFDIFF and PFDIFF.  If increases in segment reporting 
create externalities, then the effects observed in equation (6) will be stronger post ASC 
280 implementation.  If the reduced covariance improves excess value more than 
potential harm due to disclosing poor performing segments, then the interaction 
between FFDIFF and PFDIFF and the post indicator will be positive.  If disclosure of 
poor performing segments not previously reported is revealed due to the standard 
change, then additional disclosure may outweigh the effect due to the reduced 
covariance between firms. 
Table 5 presents results for estimation of equation (7).  Panel A provides results 
for firms with no changes in segment reporting, regressions (1) through (6) for single 
segment firms and regressions (7) through (12) for multi-segment firms.  Only in 
regression (4), when FFDIFF is regressed alone with excess value using assets, do 
single segment firms with no change receive additional value due to increased 
differentiation, Post * FFDIFF > 0 (p-value < 0.1), consistent with the idea that 
improved mandatory disclosure increased the role of focal firm differentiation, a 
positive externality.  There is no evidence of peer firm differentiation having a larger 
effect after ASC 280 for single segment firms with no change in segment reporting 
quality. 
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For multi-segment firms that did not change segment reporting, regressions (8) 
and (9) (using revenues to estimate excess value and PFDIFF) show peer firm 
differentiation under higher mandatory reporting precision has a negative effect on 
excess value (at least p-value < 0.05), consistent with negative externalities. 
Table 5 panel B provides results for firms with increases in segment reporting 
after ASC 280 implementation. Regressions (1) through (6) are for firms that changed 
from single segment firms to multi segment firms, and regressions (7) through (12) are 
for firms that reported more segments after ASC 280 implementation.  For firms 
reporting a single segment then multiple segments, Post * FFDIFF is negative (at least 
p-value < 0.10).  This is consistent with the idea that these firms were actually multi-
segment firms and aggregated segments to hide poorly performing, value-destroying 
segments (Berger and Hann 2003, Berger and Hann 2007).  Thus, disclosing 
differentiating segments has a larger, negative impact after the standard change.  For 
multi-segment firms that increased segment reporting after implementation, regression 
(8) using revenues to estimate excess value indicates the impact of PFDIFF on excess 
value increases after implementation (p-value < 0.05). 
Overall, results indicate segment differentiation create externalities.  The 
direction of the externalities is inconclusive. 
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Chapter 5: Robustness and Other Tests 
Varying the Cutoff of the Core Industry Portfolio 
The peer group industry portfolio is constructed by selecting SIC codes disclosed by 
at least 5 percent of TNIC peers.  Varying this cutoff does not alter interpretation of the 
results.  In untabulated results, if no cutoff is made, both FFDIFF and PFDIFF remain 
positive and significant for multi-segment firms in all cases (at least p-value < 0.10) 
except for when FFDIFF and PFDIFF are included in the same regression and assets 
are used to estimate excess value.  In that case, FFDIFF is no longer significant at any 
level.  Also multi-segment firms continue to exhibit a diversification discount; NumSeg 
is negative and Related is positive.  Results for single segment firms are also positive 
and significant in all cases; both FFDIFF and PFDIFF are associated with higher levels 
of excess value (p-value < 0.001). 
On the other extreme, if the cutoff of peer firms disclosing SIC codes is made at 25 
percent of TNIC peer firms disclosing the SIC code, results remain consistent.  For 
multi-segment firms, FFDIFF is positively associated with excess value in all cases (p-
value < 0.001) and PFDIFF is positively associated with higher levels of excess value 
(at least p-value < 0.05) but only when revenues are used to estimate excess value.  For 
single segment firms, FFDIFF is positively associated with higher levels of excess 
value in all cases (p-value < 0.001) and PFDIFF is positively associated with higher 
levels of excess value (at least p-value < 0.05) except for when assets are used to 
estimate excess value and FFDIFF is included in the regression.  Using other levels of 
cutoff provide similar results. 
33 
Firms with Line of Business as Primary Segment Type 
Under ASC 280, firms are required to select a primary and secondary method of 
reporting segments.  Firms determine whether line of business or geographic segments 
are primary or secondary segments according to internal structure used for decision 
making.  Firms choosing geographic segments as their primary segment disclosure may 
not report line of business segments similar to firms that choose line of business as their 
primary segment disclosure type.  I eliminate firms that choose geographic segments as 
their primary segment type and estimate equation (6).
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Table 6, regressions (1) and (2) provide estimations of equation (6).  Focal firm 
segment differentiation is positive and significant only when revenues are used to 
estimate excess value (p-value < 0.001).  Focal firm segment differentiation is positive 
and significant when regressed without peer firm segment differentiation, results not 
tabulated.  Peer firm segment reporting differentiation is positive and significant in all 
cases (p-value < 0.05). 
Changing the Comparison of Industry Codes 
Excess value and peer group industry codes use SIC codes.  Using both SIC codes 
to define single segment peers when calculating excess value and comparing the focal 
firm to its peer group may create a mechanical relation driving the result.  I estimate 
equation (6) using NAICS codes and Fama-French 48 industry classifications as 
alternative definitions of industry comparison groups.  I require at least 5 percent of 
peer firms report same industry code to be included in the core peer group industry code 
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 Single segment firms are by definition primary geographic segment reports and are not considered in 
this analysis. 
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portfolio.
35
  As before, I compare the focal firm’s reported segments to the peer group’s 
operations portfolio.  Comparisons are made at the six-digit NAICS code level for 
FFDIFF and four-digit NAICS code level for PFDIFF.
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  Table 6, regressions (3) 
through (6) demonstrate that results are robust to using NAICS codes to compare the 
focal firm to its peer group.  Table 6, regressions (7) through (10) demonstrate that the 
average level of peer firm differentiation is robust to using Fama-French industry 
classification.  But for multi-segment firms, focal firm differentiation is no longer 
significant.  This is due to the effect of focal firm differentiation being subsumed by the 
peer firm differentiation given the colinearity of both measures.  
Differentiating Segments Less Than Ten Percent of Sales 
ASC 280 suggests firms disaggregate a segment if sales or assets for that segment 
are greater than 10 percent of total sales or assets.  If a segment has less than 10 percent 
of sales or assets, the segment may be aggregated with other segments (see ASC 280-
10-55 Example 2: Identifying Reportable Segments).  Thus, differentiating segments 
with less than 10 percent of sales may provide information that could have been 
aggregated into another segment but is disclosed separately.  Such segments could be 
used to signal positive future prospects in industries not currently occupied by peers.  
To test whether disclosing segments less than 10 percent of total sales provides 
additional information that improves excess value I create a variable, SmallSeg, equal to 
the percentage of sales of differentiating segments less than 10 percent of total firm 
sales. 
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 Varying the percentage of peer firms disclosing an industry code (i.e., no cutoff or 1 percent versus 5 
percent) does not affect results. 
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 Six-digit NAICS codes are roughly equivalent in specificity to four-digit SIC codes.  Four-digit NAICS 
codes are roughly equivalent to three-digit SIC codes (Hoberg and Phillips 2013).  Altering this 
specification does not change the interpretation of results. 
35 
Table 7 provides estimation of equation (6), including SmallSeg.  Results show 
that reporting differentiating segments less than 10 percent of sales is incremental to 
FFDIFF and PFDIFF.  This result suggests disclosing smaller differentiating segments 
provides an additional signal not captured by focal firm or peer firm differentiation.  In 
all cases, this effect is stronger than either focal firm differentiation or peer firm 
differentiation.  For a ten percent increase in the disclosure of small, differentiating 
segments, focal firm excess value increases by 10.4 percent if revenues are used to 
estimate focal firm excess value and 4.87 percent if assets are used to estimate focal 
firm excess value.  Overall, this result is consistent with the idea that providing more 
precise segments will improve firm value.  Also, this result suggests that increased 
segment differentiation is a potential signal of segment reporting quality. 
Competition and Segment Reporting Differentiation 
Industry competition may affect the interpretation of differentiating segment 
information.  Firms in highly competitive industries may disclose differentiating 
segment information in order to attract attention.  Firms in more concentrated industries 
may disclose differentiating segment information to signal future prospects.  I examine 
whether the level of competition or concentration affects the role of segment 
differentiation in focal firm excess value by creating two indicator variables: Q1HHI is 
equal to one if the firm-year observation is below the first quartile Herfindahl Index 
(hereafter HHI) for that year, zero otherwise; Q3HHI is equal to one if the firm-year 
observation is above the third quartile HHI for that year, zero otherwise.  Q1HHI firms 
operate in more competitive industries, while Q3HHI firms operate in more 
concentrated industries. 
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Table 8 provides estimation of equation (6) with Q1HHI, Q3HHI, and 
interactions of indicator variables with my variables of interest, FFDIFF and PFDIFF, 
for multi-segment firms.  For firms in more concentrated industries, focal firm 
differentiation decreases excess value (at least p-value < 0.1) when ExValRev is the 
dependent variable.  This is consistent with the idea that firms operating in more 
concentrated industries that report differentiating segments provide value destroying 
information.  Peer firm differentiation is more significant in more concentrated 
industries (at least p-value < 0.1) when ExValRev and ExValAT are dependent variables.  
These results are consistent with the idea that firms operating in more concentrated 
industries benefit from peer firms reporting differentiating information. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
In this study I examine the effects of segment reporting differentiation on excess 
value.  I calculate a measure of segment reporting differentiation that compares reported 
segments for the focal firm to its peer group.  This measure tests the assertion that 
increases in the precision of accounting disclosure positively affects firm value 
(Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007, Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2012).  My 
measure holds constant information shared by peer firms and lets vary the amount of 
distinct segment information the focal firm reports.  I find the level of segment 
differentiation of the focal firm positively affects focal firm excess value.  Further, the 
average level of peer firm differentiation for the focal firm’s peer group also positively 
affects focal firm excess value.  Thus, when not only the focal firm but also when peers 
provide differentiating segment information, all firms benefit with an increase in excess 
value.  I assert that the improvement in value results from a reduction the perceived 
correlation between the focal firm’s and its peers’ cash flows. 
I also demonstrate that segment reporting has both positive and negative 
reporting externalities.  Using the change in accounting standard associated with 
segment reporting as an exogenous shock to the reporting environment, I show the 
market’s assessment of differentiating segment information depends on the manner in 
which segments were reported prior to ASC 280 implementation.  When firms remained 
single segment firms across reporting regimes, increased focal firm differentiation 
created a positive externality.  When firms reported the same number of multiple 
segments, peer firm differentiation created a negative externality.  Firms that changed 
from single segment reporters under SFAS No. 14 to multi-segment reporters under 
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ASC 280 received an additional reduction in excess value associated with focal firm 
segment differentiation.  Finally, firms that reported more segments after ASC 280 
demonstrate a potential positive externality associated with peer firm segment 
differentiation. 
My results suggest that segment reporting within an industry is an important 
consideration when determining how segment information affects firm value.  While the 
Post Implementation Review finds no major faults with the standard, standard setters 
may wish to think about how additional segment reporting requirements will affect the 
amount of segment information available as an industry, ultimately affecting the focal 
firm.  Further, standard setters and investors may want to examine how firms of interest 
differentiate their firm from peers using reported segments.  Results indicate that not 
only the focal firm, but also the effect of peer firms should be taken into account when 
discussing segment reporting. 
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Appendix A: Construction of DIFF 
In this appendix I provide a brief summary of how Hoberg and Phillips (2010a; 
2013) construct their product market peer dataset, how I construct the peer firm core 
operations portfolio using product market peer data provided by Hoberg and Phillips, 
and how I use the peer firm operations portfolio to construct a measure of segment 
reporting differentiation.  I also provide an example using reported segments from 
Abbott Labs in 2008. 
Hoberg and Phillips Data 
Firms are required by Regulation S-K to accurately describe all significant 
products in annual Form 10-K filings.  Hoberg and Phillips use web crawling 
algorithms to collect product descriptions from Form 10-K filings and create product 
market/industry groupings from these product descriptions.  Their sample includes all 
Form 10-K filings on the EDGAR website from 1996-2011, covering 12,187 firms with 
87,369 firm-year observations.
37
 
Texted-Based Network Industry Classifications (hereafter TNIC) provide a 
better representation of industry clustering than current industry classification schemes 
(SIC codes, NAICS codes, GICS codes) and are flexible over time.
38
  TNICs are based 
on firms with the most proximate or closest product network (See figure A.1).  Figure 
A.1 demonstrates how TNIC peers are grouped using two examples, General Dynamics 
and Antheon.  Dotted circles represent TNIC peer group for each focal firm highlighted 
                                                 
37
 Of all Form 10-K filings, roughly 100 firms did not provide product descriptions compatible with the 
measurement of Product Cosine Similarity.  These firms are not expected to impact the results. 
38
 While Hoberg and Phillips assert and provide some evidence that their TNICs provide a more accurate 
representation of industry clustering, I compare SIC codes because of their ubiquitous use in research 
and the fact that segment industries are defined in Compustat by SIC codes and have only recently 
started disclosing NAICS codes. 
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in green.  Also provided are ranks of peer firms where G denotes General Dynamic’s 
TNIC peers and A denotes Antheon’s TNIC peers.  For example, G1 is the first most 
similar TNIC peer to General Dynamics; A5 is the fifth most similar TNIC peer to 
Antheon.  Three-digit primary SIC codes—in parentheses under the firm’s name in each 
small circle—indicate the proximity of TNIC peers by SIC codes. 
Creating TNIC peer groups requires extremely common or non-descriptive 
words be eliminated from product descriptions.  Common words eliminated include 
words used by more than 25 percent of the population of EDGAR filers’ product 
descriptions, geographic words such as countries, states, or major cities, as well as 
articles, conjunctions, personal pronouns, abbreviations, and legal jargon.  The 
elimination procedure focuses attention on nouns and pronouns, words most unique in 
product descriptions.  Typical firms use roughly 200 unique words to describe their 
product portfolio. 
Product similarity is estimated by examining the cosine similarity of product 
descriptions between firms.  Cosine similarity measures the angle between two word 
vectors on a unit sphere.  This is done by first constructing a vector containing all 
unique words disclosed by all firms in sample.  This vector, N, is a vector of length n, 
where n is the number of unique words disclosed by all firms in the sample.  For each 
firm-year Form 10-K filing, vector Pi is populated from vector N with a one if firm i 
uses a word in describing its products and a zero if it does not.  Cosine similarity is the 
dot product of normalized vectors for firm i and j, defined as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗 = (𝑉𝑖 ⋅ 𝑉𝑗) where: 𝑉𝑖 =
𝑃𝑖
√𝑃𝑖⋅𝑃𝑖
 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 (A.1) 
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The dot product is higher when firms share more of the same elements between vectors 
Pi and Pj (i.e., share words in product descriptions).
39
  Product Cosine Similarityi,j is 
bounded by [0, 1]. 
 TNIC classifications are constructed using a minimum similarity threshold.  
Firms with a Product Cosine Similarity above a certain threshold are assigned to the 
same TNIC group.  Higher thresholds result in fewer product market rivals, lower 
thresholds result in more rivals.  Firms likely share more than one product in common 
given the minimum similarity threshold.  To achieve industry groups similar to three-
digit SIC codes, the minimum similarity threshold is set at 21.32 percent similarity.
40
  
TNIC peers are used in the next step to create a core industry operations portfolio. 
Construction of Peer Firm Segment Portfolio 
TNIC peers from Hoberg and Phillips data are matched by Compustat GVKEYs.  
GVKEY1 refers to the focal firm; GVKEY2 refers to TNIC peer firms.  I match TNIC 
peer firms using GVKEY2 to the Compustat Segment file to obtain all peer firm 
operations/reported segments.  I then combine the list of TNIC peer SIC codes with the 
original data provided by Hoberg and Phillips, eliminating any duplicate SIC codes.  To 
focus on the core operations of the industry, eliminating tangential operations of peer 
firms, 5 percent of peer firms must disclose an SIC code to be included in the peer 
portfolio.  Cutoffs at varying levels provide the same tenor of results. 
                                                 
39
 The construction of the vector Pi assigns equal weights to all words in the vector.  Hoberg and Phillips 
also discuss weighting the words in vector Pi by the frequency of use in the product description, a 
value-weighted approach.  They find no difference in this alternative definition of vector Pi.  Thus, they 
conclude “a firm’s decision to use a given word to describe a product is more important than how 
frequently it is used (Hoberg and Phillips 2013, 11).” 
40
 See Hoberg and Phillips (2010a; 2013) for tests that validate the improved explanatory power of TNIC 
groups. 
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Segment Reporting Differentiation (DIFF) 
My measure of segment reporting differentiation captures to what extent the 
focal firm discloses segments not correlated with its peer group.  Firms with lower 
segment reporting differentiation share more operations in common with their industry 
group and will therefore have a lower covariance between the focal firm and its peer 
group.  Firms with higher segment reporting differentiation will share fewer operations 
in common with their industry group, reducing the covariance between the focal firm 
and its peer group.  Thus, to measure segment differentiation I match SIC codes 
reported in the segment file by the focal firm with SIC codes disclosed by TNIC peers.  
I then sum the sales of segments not disclosed by peers (non-matches) and divide by the 
focal firm’s total sales.  My measure of differentiation is the percentage of sales for 
segments disclosed by the focal firm, but not disclosed by the peer group. 
𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚
 
(A.2) 
 Segment reporting differentiation at the focal firm level is calculated by taking 
the natural log of one plus DIFF.  It is important to note that measuring focal firm 
segment reporting differentiation value-weights the segments not disclosed by peer 
firms.
41
  While the firm may have few segments not reported by peers, if those 
segments make a larger portion of sales, FFDIFF will be higher. 
𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 =  ln(1 + 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹) (A.3) 
 Peer firm segment reporting quality is measured by value-weighting DIFF for 
peer firm p by the market value of each peer. 
                                                 
41
 In robustness test, I equally-equally weight my measure of segment reporting differentiation.  That is to 
say, I divide the number of unmatched segments by the total number of segments.  The results remain 
the same. 
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𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 = 𝑙𝑛 (1 + ∑
𝑀𝑉𝑝
𝑀𝑉
𝑝
𝑝=1
∗ 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑝) 
(A.4) 
An Example: Abbott Labs 
To illustrate how FFDIFF is constructed I provide an example using Abbott 
Labs in 2008.  Table A.1 presents segments disclosed by Abbott Labs in the Compustat 
Segment file.  Abbott Labs has labeled one segment as “Other” with no indication of 
which SIC code or SIC codes the Other segment identifies.  Although the Other 
segment consists seven percent of sales, it may contain information relevant to valuing 
future prospects of the firm.  Further, because there is no industry code for comparison, 
Other is eliminated.  The remaining four segments are then compared to their product-
market peer group.  
 Table A.2 gives an example of how FFDIFF is calculated for Abbott Labs.  
Abbott Labs has 73 TNIC peers from the Hoberg and Phillips dataset (see table A.3).  
As would be expected using product description similarities, most TNIC peers operate 
in similar industry codes.  The list of TNIC peers is matched to SIC codes disclosed in 
the Compustat segment file and I eliminate any four-digit SIC code not disclosed by at 
least five percent of TNIC peers.  Abbott’s TNIC peers operate in three four-digit SIC 
codes: 2834, 2835, and 2836.  These three SIC codes make up the core operations of the 
product-market peer group at the five percent level. 
I next compare these three four-digit SIC codes with industry codes disclosed by 
Abbott.  Abbott discloses four segments, 2023, 2834, 3841, and 3842.  When 
comparing TNIC peers and Abbott’s disclosed segments, only SIC code 2834 is shared.  
SIC code 2834 comprises 56.58 percent of Abbott’s sales.  The sales from the 
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remaining three four-digit SIC codes would be summed together.  SIC codes 2023, 
3841, and 3842 constitute 36.38 percent of Abbott’s sales.42  I then take one plus the 
natural log of segment sales not disclosed by peers, the natural log of one plus 36.38 
percent, or 0.3103. 
  
                                                 
42
  The sum of the shared segments and the distinct segments is less that 100 percent because the Other 
segment is eliminated. 
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Figure A.1: 
Diagram of General Dynamics' and Antheon's Ten Closest Peers 
 
This diagram is taken from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a, 3780).  This diagram illustrates the network 
created by comparing product description similarities.  The letters in the headers of each circle, “G” or 
“A”, represent to which peer group the observations belongs.  The number indicates the peer’s proximity 
to the focal firm, General Dynamics or Antheon.  For example, Lockheed Martin is the second closest 
peer to General Dynamics and the first closest peer to Antheon.  Below the header is the name of the 
firm.  The number in parentheses is the primary three-Digit SIC code of the firm. 
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Table A.1: 
Abbott Labs Compustat Segments 
Segment Name 
Primary SIC 
Code 
Segment Sales 
(in $ Millions) 
Percent of 
Sales 
Pharmaceuticals 2834 16,708.00 56.58% 
Nutritionals 2023 4,924.00 16.68% 
Diagnostics 3841 3,575.00 12.11% 
Vascular 3842 2,241.00 7.59% 
Other 
 
2,080.00 7.04% 
     Total 29,528.00 100% 
This table provides reported segments for Abbott Labs in fiscal year 2008 from the 
Compustat Segment file. 
 
 
Table A.2: 
Calculation of FFDIFF for Abbott Labs 
Company Name 
No. 
Compustat  
Segment 
Focal Firm  
SIC Code 
Percent of 
Sales 
TNIC 
Peer Firm 
SIC Codes 
ABBOTT 
LABORATORIES 4 2023 16.68% 
 
  
2834 56.58% 2834 
  
3841 12.11% 
 
  
3842 7.59% 
 
    
2835 
    
2836 
 DIFF FFDIFF 
   36.38% 0.3103 
This table provides an example of how DIFF is calculated using reported segments for Abbott Labs.  
Segment information is taken from the Compustat Segment File.  TNIC peers are matched using data 
provided by Hoberg and Phillips (2010a; 2013).  Four-digit SIC codes must be disclosed by at least five 
percent of all TNIC peers to be included in TNIC peer firm SIC codes. 
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Table A.3: 
List of TNIC Peer Firm SIC Codes 
Peer  
GVKEY Company Name 
No. 
Compustat 
Segments 
1st 
SIC 
Code 
2nd 
SIC 
Code 
3rd 
SIC 
Code 
4th 
SIC 
Code 
 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 4 3842 3841 2834 2023 
2086 BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC 3 3845 3841 2836 
 2111 BECTON DICKINSON & CO 3 3841 3826 
  2403 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO 2 2834 2023 
  4409 ENZON PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 3 6794 2836 
  4843 FOREST LABORATORIES  -CL 
A 1 2834 
   6266 JOHNSON & JOHNSON 3 3842 2844 2834 
 6730 LILLY (ELI) & CO 1 2834 
   7257 MERCK & CO 3 2834 
   7694 MARINA BIOTECH INC 1 2834 
   8530 PFIZER INC 2 2834 
   12250 AMAG PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 1 2835 
   13599 CELGENE CORP 1 2834 
   15708 ALLERGAN INC 2 3841 2834 
  23253 RADIENT PHARMACEUTICALS 
CORP 3 2835 
   24396 HEALTHWAYS INC 1 8099 
   24468 BIOGEN IDEC INC 1 2836 
   24782 PERRIGO CO 4 2834 
   25047 SCICLONE 
PHARMACEUTICALS INC 1 2834 
   25623 HI TECH PHARMACAL CO INC 1 2834 
   27845 ACTAVIS PLC 3 5122 2834 
  27988 REPROS THERAPEUTICS INC 1 2834 
   29127 INCYTE CORP 1 7375 
   30007 VIVUS INC 1 2834 
   30281 LA JOLLA PHARMACEUTICAL 
CO 1 2836 
   30674 ARIAD PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 1 2836 
   61899 IDERA PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 1 2836 
   62263 ALEXION 
PHARMACEUTICALS INC 1 2836 
   62921 NEUROCRINE BIOSCIENCES 
INC 1 2836 
   63790 MAST THERAPEUTICS INC 1 2834 
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Table A.3 (Continued) 
Peer  
GVKEY Company Name 
No. 
Compustat 
Segments 
1st 
SIC 
Code 
2nd 
SIC 
Code 
3rd 
SIC 
Code 
4th 
SIC 
Code 
64857 SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS INC 1 2836 
   65011 HESKA CORP 2 2836 2835 
  65944 DEPOMED INC 1 2834 
   122257 BIOMARIN 
PHARMACEUTICAL INC 1 2836 
   125531 OPEXA THERAPEUTICS INC 1 2836 
   128098 ERBA DIAGNOSTICS INC 1 2835 
   133468 RIGEL PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 1 2834 
   133868 LEXICON PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 1 2835 
   137642 PAIN THERAPEUTICS INC 1 2834 
   138747 TELIK INC 1 2836 
   141197 ARRAY BIOPHARMA INC 1 8071 
   146156 ALERE INC 4 2835 
   146616 CORCEPT THERAPEUTICS INC 1 2834 
   150221 GALECTIN THERAPEUTICS 
INC 1 2834 
   156857 GTX INC 1 2834 
   157865 MEI PHARMA INC 1 2834 
   157954 SANTARUS INC 1 2834 
   160668 THERAVANCE INC 1 2834 
   162892 MEDICINOVA INC 1 2836 
   166435 VANDA PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 1 2836 
   176861 OREXIGEN THERAPEUTICS 
INC 1 2836 
   177264 COVIDIEN PLC 4 3845 3842 2835 2834 
177606 VIA PHARMACEUTICALS INC 1 2836 
   177764 SYNTHETIC BIOLOGICS INC 1 2834 
   179428 DARA BIOSCIENCES INC 1 2836 
   1478 WYETH 3 2834 
   3171 OSCIENT PHARMACEUTICALS 
CORP 1 2835 
   5020 GENENTECH INC 1 2834 
   5841 CYPRESS BIOSCIENCE INC 1 2836 
   6110 IRIS INTERNATIONAL INC 2 3826 
   9340 VALEANT 
PHARMACEUTICALS -OLD 4 6794 2834 
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Table A.3 (Continued) 
Peer  
GVKEY Company Name 
No. 
Compustat 
Segments 
1st 
SIC 
Code 
2nd 
SIC 
Code 
3rd 
SIC 
Code 
4th 
SIC 
Code 
12091 MEDTOX SCIENTIFIC INC 2 8071 2835 
  12180 OSI PHARMACEUTICALS INC 1 2835 
   12233 GENZYME CORP 5 2836 
   15106 BECKMAN COULTER INC 2 8731 3826 
  20983 INDEVUS PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 1 2834 
   21066 MEDICAL NUTRITION USA 
INC 1 2834 
   24191 MEDAREX INC 1 2836 
   29312 HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES 
INC 1 2835 
   30185 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL 
LABS 1 2834 
   62826 ONYX PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 1 2834 
   133328 ARDEA BIOSCIENCES INC 1 2834 
   138662 ISTA PHARMACEUTICALS INC 1 2834 
   154708 TALON THERAPEUTICS INC 1 2836 
   155614 MIDDLEBROOK 
PHARMACEUTICALS 1 2834 
   158746 METABASIS THERAPEUTICS 
INC 1 2834 
   166200 MOLECULAR INSIGHT 
PHARMACTLS 1 2836 
   175660 TORREYPINES THERAPEUTICS 
INC 1 2836 
   178531 MAP PHARMACEUTICALS INC 1 2834 
   178855 ABRAXIS BIOSCIENCE INC 1 2836 
   264270 INHIBITEX INC 1 2836 
   This table provides a list of all TNIC peers for Abbott Labs.  The number of Compustat Segments is 
the number of segments reported in the Compustat Segment file, excluding any “Other” or 
“Corporate” segments.  SIC codes are listed in numeric order.  No TNIC Peer for Abbott Labs has 
more than four four-digit SIC codes listed in the Compustat Segment file. 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
Segment Reporting Differentiation Measures 
DIFF = 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚
 
FFDIFF =  ln(1 + 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹) 
PFDIFF = ln (1 + ∑
𝑀𝑉𝑝
𝑀𝑉
𝑝
𝑝=1 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑝). 
Excess Value Variables 
𝑉𝑎𝑙 = Actual firm value at the end of the fiscal year defined as 
the sum of equity market value and book value of debt 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖 = Accounting item of interest, such as sales or assets, for 
segment i 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖(
𝑉𝑎𝑙
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚⁄ )𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
 = The multiple of firm value to the accounting item of 
interest for the mean single-segment firm in segment i's 
industry 
𝑛 = The total number of segments reported by the firm in 
the 10-K 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙 = ∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
× [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖(
𝑉𝑎𝑙
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚⁄ )𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
] 
𝐸𝑥𝑉𝑎𝑙 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑉𝑎𝑙
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙
) 
  
𝐸𝑥𝑉𝑎𝑙 is calculated using either sales (𝐸𝑥𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑣)or 
assets (𝐸𝑥𝑉𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑇)as the accounting variable of interest. 
Control Variables 
NumSeg = Number of segment 
NumTNICPrs = The number of TNIC peers from the Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010a; 2013) data 
HHI = The Herfindahl index from Hoberg and Phillips (2010b) 
that includes private firm information 
Related = The difference between the total number of reported 
segments and the number of segments with different 
three-digit SIC codes 
Size = The natural log of total assets  
Profit = Return on assets 
Invest = The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets  
Leverage = The book value of long-term debt plus short-term debt 
divided by total assets  
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Control Variables (Continued) 
SalesGrow = Sales in the current year divided by sales in the 
previous period 
MAR = One plus the market-adjusted stock return for the fiscal 
year 
StdROE = Historical standard deviation of return on equity 
computed over the previous 5 years 
Corr5yr = Historical correlation between the annual stock returns 
and earnings per share computed on over the preceding 
5 years 
Surprise = The absolute value of the difference between current-
year earnings per share and previous-year earnings per 
share, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the 
fiscal year 
Mandatory Disclosure 
Post = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year 
observation is prior to the change in standard from 
SFAS No. 14 to SFAS No. 131 (now ASC 280), zero 
otherwise 
Segments Less than 10% of Sales 
SmallSeg = Sum of the percentage of sales for a reported segments 
in a four-digit SIC code not reported by the industry core 
operations portfolio that is also less than 10 percent of 
total sales. 
Impact of Competition   
Q1HHI = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year 
observation is below the first quartile of the Herfindahl 
index for that year, zero otherwise 
Q3HHI = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year 
observation is above the third quartile of the Herfindahl 
index for that year, zero otherwise 
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Figure 1: 
Example of How to Calculate DIFF 
Focal Firm 
Reported 
Segments  TNIC Peer Firms DIFF 
Firm A  Firm X Firm Y Firm Z Firm A 
Segments Sales     Segments Sales 
1 35     1 35 
2 65  2 2 2   
    3    
     4   
Total 100     DIFF = 35/100 = 35% 
This figure provides an example of how to calculate segment reporting differentiation for this study, 
DIFF, using a stylized example.  DIFF is the sales of segments not reported by peers, divided by 
total sales.  DIFF is used to calculate focal firm segment reporting differentiation, FFDIFF, and 
peer firm segment reporting differentiation, PFDIFF.  
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Table 1: 
Industry Composition of Single and Multi-Segment Firms and Firm-Years 
 Multi-Segment Firms Single Segment Firms 
Industry Description Firms 
Relative 
Percent 
Firm-
Years 
Relative 
Percent Firms 
Relative 
Percent 
Firm-
Years 
Relative 
Percent 
Agriculture 10 0.40% 52 0.39% 12 0.34% 44 0.26% 
Food Products 51 2.06% 344 2.57% 74 2.08% 411 2.41% 
Candy & Soda 3 0.12% 14 0.10% 10 0.28% 101 0.59% 
Beer & Liquor 11 0.44% 69 0.52% 14 0.39% 58 0.34% 
Tobacco Products 2 0.08% 4 0.03% 2 0.06% 5 0.03% 
Recreation 25 1.01% 130 0.97% 42 1.18% 160 0.94% 
Entertainment 38 1.54% 151 1.13% 82 2.30% 396 2.33% 
Printing and Publishing 27 1.09% 180 1.35% 28 0.79% 124 0.73% 
Consumer Goods 55 2.22% 335 2.51% 69 1.94% 330 1.94% 
Apparel 50 2.02% 277 2.07% 68 1.91% 340 2.00% 
Healthcare 75 3.03% 337 2.52% 90 2.53% 433 2.54% 
Medical Equipment 82 3.32% 422 3.16% 171 4.80% 869 5.10% 
Pharmaceutical Products 99 4.00% 473 3.54% 253 7.10% 1,132 6.65% 
Chemicals 87 3.52% 535 4.00% 52 1.46% 220 1.29% 
Rubber and Plastic Products 33 1.33% 142 1.06% 43 1.21% 178 1.05% 
Textiles 28 1.13% 120 0.90% 32 0.90% 102 0.60% 
Construction Materials 70 2.83% 472 3.53% 61 1.71% 257 1.51% 
Construction 33 1.33% 150 1.12% 49 1.37% 226 1.33% 
Steel Works, Etc. 66 2.67% 379 2.83% 47 1.32% 215 1.26% 
Fabricated Products 14 0.57% 69 0.52% 18 0.51% 98 0.58% 
Machinery 137 5.54% 903 6.75% 129 3.62% 622 3.65% 
Electrical Equipment 63 2.55% 436 3.26% 62 1.74% 276 1.62% 
Automobiles and Trucks 59 2.39% 285 2.13% 49 1.37% 261 1.53% 
Aircraft 20 0.81% 180 1.35% 13 0.36% 43 0.25% 
Shipbuilding, and Railroad Equipment 9 0.36% 36 0.27% 5 0.14% 37 0.22% 
Defense 9 0.36% 74 0.55% 5 0.14% 13 0.08% 
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Table 1 (Continued)         
 Multi-Segment Firms Single Segment Firms 
Industry Description Firms 
Relative 
Percent 
Firm-
Years 
Relative 
Percent Firms 
Relative 
Percent 
Firm-
Years 
Relative 
Percent 
Precious Metals 7 0.28% 36 0.27% 12 0.34% 40 0.23% 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 13 0.53% 63 0.47% 6 0.17% 31 0.18% 
Coal 8 0.32% 31 0.23% 5 0.14% 17 0.10% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 111 4.49% 607 4.54% 168 4.71% 832 4.89% 
Personal Services 32 1.29% 147 1.10% 39 1.09% 215 1.26% 
Business Services 395 15.98% 1,714 12.82% 577 16.19% 2,259 13.27% 
Computers 111 4.49% 566 4.23% 204 5.72% 911 5.35% 
Electronic Equipment 182 7.36% 1,008 7.54% 314 8.81% 1,719 10.10% 
Measuring and Control Equipment 68 2.75% 473 3.54% 92 2.58% 493 2.90% 
Business Supplies 55 2.22% 360 2.69% 45 1.26% 161 0.95% 
Shipping Containers 12 0.49% 97 0.73% 10 0.28% 44 0.26% 
Wholesale 118 4.77% 709 5.30% 164 4.60% 728 4.28% 
Retail 138 5.58% 643 4.81% 306 8.59% 1,837 10.79% 
Restaurants, Hotels, and Motels 33 1.33% 162 1.21% 106 2.97% 633 3.72% 
Trading 4 0.16% 24 0.18% 2 0.06% 9 0.05% 
Other 29 1.17% 160 1.20% 33 0.93% 139 0.82% 
Total 2,472 100% 13,369 100% 3,564 100% 17,026 100% 
 
This table provides the industry composition of multi-segment and single segment firms and firm-years over the sample period 1996 to 
2011.  Industries in this table are defined using the Fama-French 48 industries for descriptive purposes. 
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Table 2: 
Valuation, Performance, Size, and Model Descriptive Statistics  
for Single and Multi-Segment Firms 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min 25
th
  Median 75
th
  Max 
Panel A: Multi-Segment Firms 
ExValRev -0.23 0.61 -1.39 -0.69 -0.26 0.19 1.38 
ExValAT -0.09 0.55 -1.39 -0.47 -0.10 0.28 1.38 
PM 0.05 0.27 -16.38 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.90 
ROA 0.06 0.15 -1.44 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.37 
NumSeg 2.96 1.16 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 10.00 
Related 1.02 1.15 -1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9.00 
V 4,802.12 18,314.73 3.14 178.46 731.55 2,761.24 460,767.94 
Sale 2,711.46 5,983.62 20.06 177.63 649.42 2,153.95 38,614.00 
Asset 2,927.75 7,999.26 3.60 160.67 610.14 2,155.40 97,860.60 
DIFFFF 0.37 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.85 1.00 
DIFFPF 0.20 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.28 1.00 
NumTNICPrs 46.01 59.27 1.00 9.00 23.00 58.00 590.00 
HHI 0.20 0.19 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.27 1.00 
Profit 0.02 0.14 -1.48 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.26 
Invest 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.37 
Leverage 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.06 0.21 0.34 0.95 
SalesGrow 0.04 0.25 -2.27 -0.02 0.07 0.15 0.89 
StdROE 0.33 1.09 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.18 10.62 
MAR 1.11 0.50 -0.31 0.83 1.08 1.34 3.29 
Corr5yr 0.15 0.50 -0.92 -0.24 0.20 0.57 0.96 
Surprise 1.72 4.10 0.00 0.20 0.52 1.31 29.00 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min 25
th
  Median 75
th
  Max 
Panel B: Single Segment Firms 
ExValRev -0.16 0.55 -1.39 -0.55 -0.07 0.19 1.38 
ExValAT -0.13 0.49 -1.39 -0.46 -0.06 0.16 1.38 
PM 0.01 0.44 -16.38 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.90 
ROA 0.04 0.19 -1.44 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.37 
V 2,291.36 9,913.58 2.36 87.79 322.16 1,216.13 467,092.88 
Sale 1,312.15 4,052.03 20.00 75.68 233.78 778.79 38,614.00 
Asset 1,214.17 3,854.24 2.73 75.91 234.00 762.36 87,095.00 
DIFFFF 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 
DIFFPF 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.18 1.00 
NumTNICPrs 75.01 85.02 1.00 13.00 42.00 109.00 608.00 
HHI 0.18 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.22 1.00 
Profit 0.00 0.18 -1.48 -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.26 
Invest 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.37 
Leverage 0.20 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.33 0.95 
SalesGrow 0.06 0.28 -2.27 -0.02 0.08 0.18 0.89 
StdROE 0.44 1.33 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.25 10.62 
MAR 1.13 0.56 -0.31 0.80 1.08 1.39 3.29 
Corr5yr 0.19 0.50 -0.92 -0.19 0.25 0.61 0.96 
Surprise 1.82 4.23 0.00 0.21 0.56 1.37 29.00 
 
This table provides statistics for valuation, performance, and size statistics for the sample period, 1996 to 2011 for 
single and multi-segments.  PM is the earnings before income and taxes (sum of income before extraordinary items, 
interested and related expenses, and income taxes).  ROA is return on assets (EBIT defined previously divided by 
total assets).  V value of the firm (price per share times the number of shares plus current and long-term liabilities).  
DIFFFF and DIFFPF are the values of segment reporting differentiation (percentage of sales not disclosed by peers) 
before adding one and taking the natural log.  The remaining variables are defined in appendix B. 
 
  
  
6
4
 
Table 3: 
Correlations for Single and Multi-Segment Firms 
Panel A: Multi-Segment Firms 
 
ExValRev ExValAT FFDIFF PFDIFF NumSeg NumTNICPrs HHI Related Size 
ExValRev 1 0.623*** 0.048*** 0.058*** 0.031** -0.033** 0.025* 0.034** 0.170*** 
ExValAT 0.630*** 1 0.036** 0.044*** 0.023 -0.059*** 0.002 0.022 0.115*** 
FFDIFF 0.046*** 0.040*** 1 0.379*** 0.011 -0.216*** 0.247*** -0.205*** -0.093*** 
PFDIFF 0.052*** 0.043*** 0.351*** 1 -0.002 -0.235*** 0.173*** -0.142*** -0.023* 
 NumSeg 0.025* 0.022 0.042*** 0.009 1 -0.04*** -0.055*** 0.671*** 0.343*** 
NumTNICPrs -0.041*** -0.035** -0.271*** -0.281*** -0.019 1 -0.483*** 0.074*** 0.037*** 
HHI 0.024* 0.014 0.198*** 0.189*** -0.030** -0.873*** 1 -0.050*** -0.266*** 
Related 0.029* 0.026 -0.234*** -0.156*** 0.540*** 0.069*** -0.017 1 0.188*** 
Size 0.176*** 0.116*** -0.081*** -0.004 0.320*** 0.100*** -0.273*** 0.144*** 1 
Profit 0.212*** 0.352*** 0.021 0.042*** 0.050*** -0.025* -0.023* 0.001 0.186*** 
Invest 0.012 0.091*** -0.013 -0.052*** 0.015 0.089*** -0.163*** -0.053*** 0.086*** 
Leverage 0.034** -0.060*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.078*** -0.099*** -0.022 -0.054*** 0.231*** 
SalesGrow 0.080*** 0.080*** -0.028* -0.036*** 0.020 0.066*** -0.043*** 0.003 0.023* 
StdROE -0.096*** -0.075*** -0.084*** -0.102*** -0.06*** 0.091*** -0.016 0.052*** -0.201*** 
MAR 0.115*** 0.194*** -0.011 -0.006 -0.010 0.001 0.022 0.014 -0.073*** 
Corr5yr -0.071*** -0.088*** -0.033** -0.048*** -0.023* 0.032** -0.004 -0.005 -0.124*** 
Surprise -0.133*** -0.17*** -0.064*** -0.079*** -0.043*** 0.051*** 0.005 0.017 -0.158*** 
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Table 3 Panel A (Continued) 
 
Profit Invest Leverage SalesGrow StdROE MAR Corr5yr Surprise 
ExValRev 0.143*** 0.018 0.044*** 0.049*** -0.021 0.097*** -0.068*** -0.063*** 
ExValAT 0.189*** 0.064*** -0.041*** 0.057*** 0.004 0.182*** -0.084*** -0.089*** 
FFDIFF 0.021 -0.057*** 0.073*** -0.010 -0.020 -0.013 -0.030** -0.042*** 
PFDIFF 0.052*** -0.065*** 0.089*** -0.015 -0.041*** -0.027* -0.028* -0.03** 
NumSeg 0.072*** 0.001 0.048*** 0.026* -0.028* -0.019 -0.019 -0.016 
NumTNICPrs -0.106*** 0.103*** -0.110*** 0.017 0.029** 0.023* 0.062*** 0.038*** 
HHI -0.008 -0.114*** -0.002 -0.023* 0.009 0.025* 0.023* 0.001 
Related 0.014 -0.019 -0.039*** 0.004 0.018 0.002 -0.005 0.009 
Size 0.221*** 0.044*** 0.161*** 0.039*** -0.082*** -0.108*** -0.119*** -0.063*** 
Profit 1 0.042*** -0.174*** 0.259*** -0.107*** 0.164*** -0.091*** -0.06*** 
Invest 0.128*** 1 0.059*** 0.088*** -0.024* -0.058*** 0.000 -0.015 
Leverage -0.253*** 0.064*** 1 -0.026* 0.156*** -0.068*** 0.012 0.034*** 
SalesGrow 0.299*** 0.089*** -0.04*** 1 -0.015 0.091*** -0.010 -0.14*** 
StdROE -0.256*** -0.079*** 0.131*** -0.062*** 1 0.033** 0.031** 0.077*** 
MAR 0.165*** -0.065*** -0.073*** 0.144*** 0.05*** 1 -0.011 0.036*** 
Corr5yr -0.106*** -0.001 0.002 -0.014 0.093*** -0.017 1 0.059*** 
Surprise -0.491*** -0.067*** 0.064*** -0.166*** 0.32*** 0.015 0.136*** 1 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Correlations for Single and Multi-Segment Firms 
Panel B: Single Segment Firms 
 
ExValRev ExValAT FFDIFF PFDIFF NumTNICPrs HHI Size 
ExValRev 1 0.707*** 0.103*** 0.052*** 0.039*** -0.039*** 0.226*** 
ExValAT 0.703*** 1 0.066*** 0.047*** 0.026** -0.036*** 0.161*** 
FFDIFF 0.112*** 0.083*** 1 0.385*** -0.223*** 0.265*** -0.110*** 
PFDIFF 0.045*** 0.052*** 0.31*** 1 -0.263*** 0.224*** -0.048*** 
NumTNICPrs 0.014 0.000 -0.277*** -0.285*** 1 -0.502*** 0.081*** 
HHI -0.027** -0.024* 0.214*** 0.238*** -0.852*** 1 -0.255*** 
Size 0.232*** 0.166*** -0.109*** -0.085*** 0.143*** -0.279*** 1 
Profit 0.201*** 0.363*** 0.036*** 0.024* -0.076*** -0.010 0.183*** 
Invest 0.046*** 0.131*** -0.04*** -0.108*** 0.064*** -0.184*** 0.149*** 
Leverage -0.027** -0.063*** 0.013 0.016 -0.146*** 0.044*** 0.195*** 
SalesGrow 0.161*** 0.219*** -0.04*** -0.025* 0.122*** -0.073*** 0.095*** 
StdROE -0.131*** -0.079*** -0.093*** -0.078*** 0.143*** 0.005 -0.262*** 
MAR 0.136*** 0.231*** -0.011 -0.010 -0.007 0.020* -0.065*** 
Corr5yr -0.072*** -0.064*** -0.011 -0.015 0.001 -0.006 -0.106*** 
Surprise -0.168*** -0.204*** -0.044*** -0.039*** 0.058*** 0.003 -0.169*** 
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Table 3 Panel B (Continued) 
 
Profit Invest Leverage SalesGrow StdROE MAR Corr5yr Surprise 
ExValRev 0.120*** 0.042*** 0.001 0.099*** -0.021 0.120*** -0.076*** -0.09*** 
ExValAT 0.211*** 0.112*** -0.025* 0.166*** 0.022* 0.219*** -0.069*** -0.108*** 
FFDIFF 0.034*** -0.086*** -0.016 -0.027** -0.041*** -0.011 -0.013 -0.028** 
PFDIFF 0.044*** -0.073*** 0.042*** -0.026** -0.053*** -0.011 -0.015 -0.024* 
NumTNICPrs -0.160*** 0.062*** -0.086*** 0.098*** 0.109*** -0.004 -0.002 0.038*** 
HHI 0.016 -0.129*** 0.015 -0.053*** -0.019 0.024* 0.007 -0.001 
Size 0.202*** 0.104*** 0.163*** 0.073*** -0.078*** -0.090*** -0.108*** -0.069*** 
Profit 1 0.057*** -0.214*** 0.253*** -0.142*** 0.192*** -0.079*** -0.026** 
Invest 0.166*** 1 0.133*** 0.093*** -0.034*** -0.053*** 0.014 -0.029** 
Leverage -0.256*** 0.136*** 1 -0.019 0.199*** -0.061*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 
SalesGrow 0.293*** 0.102*** -0.028** 1 0.002 0.122*** -0.035*** -0.073*** 
StdROE -0.273*** -0.146*** 0.124*** -0.030*** 1 0.034*** 0.045*** 0.098*** 
MAR 0.198*** -0.064*** -0.058*** 0.184*** 0.066*** 1 0.018 0.029** 
Corr5yr -0.095*** 0.001 0.041*** -0.037*** 0.107*** 0.009 1 0.076*** 
Surprise -0.401*** -0.105*** 0.063*** -0.139*** 0.312*** 0.010 0.154*** 1 
This table provides Pearson correlations above the diagonal and Spearman correlations below the diagonal.  All variables are defined in 
appendix B. 
Significance: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, and * p-value < 0.1. 
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Table 4 
Regressions of ExVal on Segment Reporting Differentiation & Controls 
Panel A: Multi-Segment Firms 
  All Firm-Years 
 
Post ASC 280 
 ExValRev ExValAT  ExValRev ExValAT 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
 
      
FFDIFF 0.14*** 
 
0.11*** 0.092** 
 
0.070* 
 
0.15*** 
 
0.12*** 0.095*** 
 
0.075** 
 
(4.19) 
 
(3.32) (2.569) 
 
(1.940) 
 
(4.39) 
 
(3.56) (2.597) 
 
(2.027) 
PFDIFF 
 
0.200*** 0.15** 
 
0.14** 0.106* 
 
 
0.197*** 0.14** 
 
0.13** 0.098* 
  
(3.126) (2.24) 
 
(2.56) (1.927) 
 
 
(3.017) (2.10) 
 
(2.41) (1.751) 
NumSeg -0.05*** -0.041*** -0.05*** -0.026** -0.02* -0.027** 
 
-0.05*** -0.040*** -0.05*** -0.026** -0.02* -0.027** 
 
(-3.69) (-3.231) (-3.76) (-2.068) (-1.82) (-2.122) 
 
(-3.57) (-3.105) (-3.65) (-2.048) (-1.78) (-2.098) 
Related 0.04*** 0.033*** 0.04*** 0.023* 0.02 0.025** 
 
0.04*** 0.034*** 0.04*** 0.024* 0.02 0.026** 
 
(3.19) (2.712) (3.34) (1.845) (1.59) (1.982) 
 
(3.22) (2.707) (3.37) (1.916) (1.62) (2.044) 
NumTNICPrs 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.001** -0.00** -0.001** 
 
0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.001** -0.00** -0.001** 
 
(0.14) (0.325) (0.35) (-2.435) (-2.29) (-2.282) 
 
(0.14) (0.328) (0.35) (-2.368) (-2.23) (-2.230) 
HHI 0.19*** 0.213*** 0.19*** 0.013 0.03 0.011 
 
0.19*** 0.216*** 0.19*** 0.010 0.03 0.008 
 
(3.44) (3.757) (3.35) (0.220) (0.51) (0.192) 
 
(3.40) (3.779) (3.31) (0.165) (0.49) (0.145) 
Size 0.06*** 0.063*** 0.06*** 0.038*** 0.04*** 0.038*** 
 
0.06*** 0.061*** 0.06*** 0.036*** 0.04*** 0.036*** 
 
(7.64) (7.482) (7.66) (3.925) (3.86) (3.920) 
 
(7.37) (7.207) (7.39) (3.670) (3.60) (3.664) 
PM 0.43*** 0.427*** 0.42*** 0.480*** 0.48*** 0.472*** 
 
0.44*** 0.432*** 0.43*** 0.492*** 0.49*** 0.485*** 
 
(4.88) (4.822) (4.76) (4.098) (4.10) (4.049) 
 
(4.90) (4.850) (4.77) (4.123) (4.13) (4.079) 
Invest 0.30 0.299 0.32 0.999*** 1.00*** 1.017*** 
 
0.28 0.280 0.30 0.976*** 0.98*** 0.993*** 
 
(1.23) (1.252) (1.34) (4.258) (4.30) (4.348) 
 
(1.13) (1.147) (1.23) (3.986) (4.01) (4.065) 
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Table 4 Panel A (Continued)            
Leverage 0.16*** 0.155*** 0.15*** -0.093 -0.10 -0.100 
 
0.16*** 0.160*** 0.15*** -0.090 -0.09 -0.096 
 
(2.82) (2.780) (2.64) (-1.407) (-1.48) (-1.535) 
 
(2.83) (2.815) (2.66) (-1.324) (-1.38) (-1.439) 
SalesGrow 0.02 0.020 0.02 -0.011 -0.01 -0.010 
 
0.02 0.019 0.02 -0.015 -0.01 -0.013 
 
(0.58) (0.594) (0.63) (-0.517) (-0.50) (-0.449) 
 
(0.52) (0.543) (0.58) (-0.694) (-0.67) (-0.621) 
StdROE -0.00 -0.003 -0.00 0.017* 0.02* 0.017** 
 
-0.00 -0.003 -0.00 0.018* 0.02** 0.018** 
 
(-0.51) (-0.408) (-0.38) (1.890) (1.95) (1.962) 
 
(-0.54) (-0.441) (-0.42) (1.922) (1.98) (1.987) 
MAR 0.14*** 0.139*** 0.14*** 0.206*** 0.21*** 0.207*** 
 
0.14*** 0.140*** 0.14*** 0.204*** 0.20*** 0.205*** 
 
(6.25) (6.339) (6.41) (9.060) (9.12) (9.150) 
 
(6.17) (6.236) (6.33) (8.815) (8.88) (8.897) 
Corr5yr -0.05*** -0.048*** -0.05*** -0.052*** -0.05*** -0.052*** 
 
-0.05*** -0.051*** -0.05*** -0.053*** -0.05*** -0.053*** 
 
(-3.08) (-3.159) (-3.10) (-3.181) (-3.26) (-3.193) 
 
(-3.19) (-3.315) (-3.24) (-3.114) (-3.21) (-3.131) 
Surprise -0.01*** -0.007*** -0.01*** -0.010*** -0.01*** -0.010***  -0.01*** -0.007*** -0.01*** -0.011*** -0.01*** -0.011*** 
 (-3.93) (-4.154) (-3.95) (-8.216) (-8.58) (-8.288)  (-3.76) (-3.981) (-3.77) (-7.989) (-8.32) (-8.037) 
Constant -0.83*** -0.835*** -0.85*** -0.526*** -0.53*** -0.541*** 
 
-0.83*** -0.831*** -0.85*** -0.514*** -0.52*** -0.528*** 
  (-13.67) (-13.746) (-13.91) (-7.153) (-7.26) (-7.267) 
 
(-13.30) (-13.293) (-13.51) (-6.777) (-6.87) (-6.886) 
 
             No. Obs. 11,959 11,959 11,959 10,111 10,111 10,111 
 
11,491 11,491 11,491 9,705 9,705 9,705 
Adj. R2 6.81% 6.74% 6.95% 9.02% 9.02% 9.12% 
 
6.78% 6.67% 6.91% 8.82% 8.79% 8.90% 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Regressions of ExVal on Segment Reporting Differentiation & Controls 
Panel B: Single Segment Firms 
  All Firm-Years 
 
Post ASC 280 
 ExValRev ExValAT  ExValRev ExValAT 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
 
      
FFDIFF 0.26*** 
 
0.24*** 0.162*** 
 
0.139*** 
 
0.27*** 
 
0.25*** 0.165*** 
 
0.142*** 
 
(11.62) 
 
(9.97) (7.819) 
 
(6.648) 
 
(11.93) 
 
(10.70) (7.499) 
 
(6.309) 
PFDIFF 
 
0.252*** 0.10** 
 
0.21*** 0.123*** 
 
 
0.251*** 0.09** 
 
0.21*** 0.121*** 
  
(5.951) (2.26) 
 
(5.35) (3.118) 
 
 
(6.166) (2.29) 
 
(5.58) (3.195) 
NumTNICPrs 0.00*** 0.000*** 0.00*** 0.000** 0.00** 0.000** 
 
0.00*** 0.000** 0.00*** 0.000** 0.00** 0.000** 
 
(2.80) (2.595) (2.98) (1.966) (2.08) (2.312) 
 
(2.76) (2.541) (2.90) (2.122) (2.24) (2.463) 
HHI 0.05 0.097** 0.04 0.016 0.04 0.010 
 
0.06 0.110** 0.05 0.013 0.04 0.007 
 
(1.14) (2.161) (1.00) (0.458) (1.22) (0.294) 
 
(1.35) (2.404) (1.21) (0.330) (1.04) (0.175) 
Size 0.08*** 0.078*** 0.08*** 0.044*** 0.04*** 0.044*** 
 
0.08*** 0.076*** 0.08*** 0.043*** 0.04*** 0.043*** 
 
(10.98) (10.529) (10.90) (5.755) (5.60) (5.700) 
 
(10.49) (10.191) (10.44) (5.320) (5.19) (5.262) 
PM 0.12** 0.125** 0.12** 0.325*** 0.33*** 0.323*** 
 
0.13** 0.131** 0.13** 0.336*** 0.34*** 0.334*** 
 
(2.14) (2.284) (2.11) (8.579) (8.63) (8.487) 
 
(2.16) (2.286) (2.14) (8.798) (8.84) (8.725) 
Invest 0.27* 0.238 0.28* 0.783*** 0.77*** 0.794*** 
 
0.22 0.190 0.23 0.747*** 0.73*** 0.758*** 
 
(1.65) (1.453) (1.70) (5.780) (5.75) (5.879) 
 
(1.33) (1.137) (1.38) (5.507) (5.52) (5.635) 
Leverage -0.02 -0.035 -0.03 -0.054 -0.06 -0.058 
 
-0.03 -0.044 -0.04 -0.056 -0.06 -0.060 
 
(-0.65) (-0.986) (-0.77) (-1.271) (-1.50) (-1.391) 
 
(-0.86) (-1.191) (-0.95) (-1.246) (-1.46) (-1.344) 
SalesGrow 0.10*** 0.099*** 0.10*** 0.150*** 0.15*** 0.150*** 
 
0.09*** 0.087*** 0.09*** 0.138*** 0.14*** 0.138*** 
 
(3.32) (3.369) (3.32) (7.397) (7.56) (7.434) 
 
(2.96) (3.010) (2.97) (6.467) (6.55) (6.484) 
StdROE 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.023*** 0.02*** 0.023*** 
 
0.01 0.005 0.01 0.024*** 0.02*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.88) (0.853) (0.97) (5.060) (5.08) (5.156) 
 
(1.09) (1.048) (1.17) (4.897) (4.91) (4.983) 
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Table 4 Panel B (Continued)            
MAR 0.14*** 0.136*** 0.14*** 0.186*** 0.18*** 0.187*** 
 
0.14*** 0.134*** 0.14*** 0.184*** 0.18*** 0.185*** 
 
(6.88) (6.581) (6.93) (12.745) (12.37) (12.897) 
 
(6.14) (5.895) (6.18) (11.380) (11.07) (11.509) 
Corr5yr -0.05*** -0.051*** -0.05*** -0.042*** -0.04*** -0.042*** 
 
-0.04*** -0.043*** -0.04*** -0.035** -0.04*** -0.035** 
 
(-3.24) (-3.355) (-3.23) (-2.901) (-2.97) (-2.874) 
 
(-3.05) (-3.186) (-3.03) (-2.540) (-2.63) (-2.513) 
Surprise -0.01*** -0.009*** -0.01*** -0.011*** -0.01*** -0.011***  -0.01*** -0.009*** -0.01*** -0.010*** -0.01*** -0.010*** 
 (-11.10) (-11.626) (-11.04) (-12.417) (-12.75) (-12.413)  (-10.10) (-10.674) (-10.08) (-10.996) (-11.42) (-11.065) 
Constant -0.85*** -0.822*** -0.87*** -0.663*** -0.65*** -0.677*** 
 
-0.84*** -0.808*** -0.85*** -0.653*** -0.64*** -0.666*** 
  (-15.79) (-14.966) (-15.68) (-12.637) (-12.74) (-12.752) 
 
(-14.81) (-14.386) (-14.91) (-11.916) (-12.23) (-12.152) 
 
             No. Obs. 15,432 15,432 15,432 16,488 16,488 16,488 
 
14,027 14,027 14,027 15,019 15,019 15,019 
Adj. R2 10.60% 9.23% 10.67% 14.13% 13.68% 14.27% 
 
10.24% 8.76% 10.30% 13.73% 13.26% 13.86% 
This table presents the estimation of equation (6).  Variables are defined in appendix B.  Panel A presents estimations for multi-segment firms.  Panel B 
presents estimations for single segment firms.  Equation (6) is estimated first with all firm years, regressions 1-6, then with firm years post ASC 280 to hold 
constant the reporting regime, regressions 7-12.  Coefficients are presented on top and t-statistics below in parentheses.  All regressions are estimated using 
two-way clustering by firm and year. 
Significance: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, and * p-value <0.1 
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Table 5 
Regressions of ExVal on Segment Reporting Differentiation & Controls for Firms with and without a Change in Segments 
Panel A: No Change in Segment Reporting 
  Single Segment Firms 
 
Multi-Segment Firms 
 ExValRev ExValAT  ExValRev ExValAT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
 
      
Post 0.00 -0.006 -0.01 -0.027 -0.05 -0.046 
 
-0.04 0.035 -0.00 -0.029 0.01 -0.001 
 
(0.13) (-0.135) (-0.14) (-0.565) (-0.82) (-0.809) 
 
(-0.76) (0.831) (-0.00) (-0.458) (0.19) (-0.023) 
FFDIFF 0.25*** 
 
0.25*** 0.189*** 
 
0.197*** 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.14 0.036 
 
-0.020 
 
(4.75) 
 
(3.53) (5.809) 
 
(4.456) 
 
(-0.82) 
 
(-1.53) (0.438) 
 
(-0.279) 
Post*FFDIFF 0.02 
 
0.00 0.045* 
 
0.001 
 
0.07 
 
0.15 0.007 
 
0.045 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.01) (1.694) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.71) 
 
(1.18) (0.055) 
 
(0.318) 
PFDIFF 
 
0.175* 0.03 
 
0.09 -0.034 
 
 
0.224 0.29** 
 
0.29** 0.296*** 
  
(1.691) (0.20) 
 
(0.73) (-0.259) 
 
 
(1.561) (2.10) 
 
(2.50) (2.822) 
Post*PFDIFF 
 
0.102 0.10 
 
0.20 0.199 
 
 
-0.272*** -0.35** 
 
-0.19 -0.213 
  
(1.047) (0.72) 
 
(1.64) (1.423) 
 
 
(-3.192) (-2.46) 
 
(-1.51) (-1.350) 
NumSeg 
      
 
-0.05 -0.050* -0.04 -0.039 -0.04 -0.039 
       
 
(-1.57) (-1.750) (-1.49) (-1.216) (-1.27) (-1.201) 
Related 
      
 
-0.00 0.002 -0.00 0.018 0.02 0.021 
       
 
(-0.11) (0.049) (-0.08) (0.461) (0.53) (0.551) 
NumTNICPrs 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.000 -0.00 -0.000 
 
0.00 0.001 0.00 -0.001* -0.00 -0.001 
 
(1.35) (1.341) (1.51) (-0.393) (-0.43) (-0.303) 
 
(1.25) (1.293) (1.27) (-1.691) (-1.51) (-1.531) 
HHI -0.02 0.029 -0.02 -0.062 -0.02 -0.059 
 
0.26 0.238 0.25 -0.074 -0.08 -0.088 
 
(-0.26) (0.308) (-0.25) (-0.919) (-0.28) (-0.892) 
 
(1.44) (1.400) (1.42) (-0.498) (-0.63) (-0.617) 
Size 0.09*** 0.091*** 0.09*** 0.077*** 0.08*** 0.077*** 
 
0.08*** 0.076*** 0.08*** 0.069*** 0.07*** 0.070*** 
 
(7.90) (7.602) (7.91) (7.511) (7.14) (7.412) 
 
(4.22) (4.134) (4.22) (4.681) (4.70) (4.670) 
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Table 5 Panel A (Continued)            
PM 0.19* 0.194* 0.19* 0.338*** 0.34*** 0.334*** 
 
0.49 0.479 0.47 1.222** 1.20** 1.196** 
 
(1.82) (1.731) (1.79) (3.502) (3.35) (3.410) 
 
(1.06) (1.027) (1.01) (2.410) (2.28) (2.273) 
Invest 0.93*** 0.866*** 0.94*** 1.343*** 1.29*** 1.353*** 
 
1.83*** 1.834*** 1.84*** 1.902*** 1.90*** 1.908*** 
 
(5.48) (4.869) (5.37) (8.756) (8.08) (8.312) 
 
(4.37) (4.423) (4.47) (5.020) (4.99) (5.080) 
Leverage -0.02 -0.030 -0.02 -0.078 -0.09 -0.083 
 
0.01 0.001 0.00 -0.021 -0.04 -0.044 
 
(-0.23) (-0.429) (-0.30) (-1.252) (-1.47) (-1.374) 
 
(0.06) (0.006) (0.00) (-0.107) (-0.20) (-0.207) 
SalesGrow 0.16*** 0.147** 0.15*** 0.149*** 0.14*** 0.147*** 
 
-0.09 -0.089 -0.10 -0.029 -0.03 -0.035 
 
(2.64) (2.562) (2.59) (3.963) (3.96) (3.977) 
 
(-1.37) (-1.390) (-1.56) (-0.594) (-0.75) (-0.752) 
StdROE 0.01 0.006 0.01 0.030** 0.03** 0.031** 
 
0.00 0.002 0.00 0.029 0.03 0.030 
 
(0.40) (0.438) (0.45) (2.096) (2.22) (2.173) 
 
(0.05) (0.115) (0.13) (0.980) (1.05) (1.048) 
MAR 0.13*** 0.126*** 0.13*** 0.196*** 0.19*** 0.197*** 
 
0.12*** 0.120*** 0.12*** 0.177*** 0.18*** 0.178*** 
 
(7.03) (6.366) (7.08) (12.919) (11.50) (13.117) 
 
(4.63) (4.367) (4.71) (8.876) (8.50) (8.587) 
Corr5yr -0.11*** -0.115*** -0.11*** -0.089*** -0.09*** -0.088*** 
 
-0.09* -0.090* -0.09* -0.032 -0.03 -0.031 
 
(-4.76) (-4.849) (-4.73) (-4.749) (-4.90) (-4.764) 
 
(-1.82) (-1.802) (-1.82) (-0.992) (-0.99) (-0.981) 
Surprise -0.01*** -0.009*** -0.01*** -0.009*** -0.01*** -0.009*** 
 
-0.01*** -0.006*** -0.01*** -0.009*** -0.01*** -0.009*** 
 
(-4.96) (-5.381) (-4.94) (-8.767) (-10.40) (-9.201) 
 
(-3.00) (-2.905) (-3.06) (-3.397) (-3.50) (-3.371) 
Constant -0.93*** -0.891*** -0.94*** -0.839*** -0.80*** -0.843*** 
 
-0.93*** -0.981*** -0.97*** -0.725*** -0.77*** -0.763*** 
  (-11.61) (-10.846) (-11.35) (-12.223) (-10.03) (-10.767) 
 
(-5.99) (-6.549) (-6.30) (-5.602) (-5.85) (-5.816) 
       
 
      
No. Obs. 3,390 3,390 3,390 3,588 3,588 3,588 
 
1,042 1,042 1,042 987 987 987 
Adj. R2 15.11% 13.64% 15.13% 20.14% 19.11% 20.24% 
 
9.44% 9.62% 9.62% 18.56% 19.04% 18.89% 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Regressions of ExVal on Segment Reporting Differentiation & Controls for Firms with and without a Change in Segments 
Panel B: Increases in Segment Reporting 
  Single Segment to Multi-Segment 
 
Multi-Segment to Multi-Segment 
 ExValRev ExValAT  ExValRev ExValAT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
 
      
Post -0.00 -0.017 0.01 0.035 -0.02 0.010 
 
-0.03 -0.015 -0.04 -0.009 -0.02 -0.031 
 
(-0.02) (-0.171) (0.13) (0.556) (-0.28) (0.139) 
 
(-0.26) (-0.245) (-0.40) (-0.174) (-0.48) (-0.621) 
FFDIFF 0.25*** 
 
0.21*** 0.196*** 
 
0.192*** 
 
0.10 
 
0.11 0.031 
 
0.050 
 
(5.44) 
 
(4.32) (4.702) 
 
(5.120) 
 
(0.93) 
 
(0.79) (0.375) 
 
(0.508) 
Post*FFDIFF -0.20** 
 
-0.19* -0.136** 
 
-0.193*** 
 
0.14 
 
0.12 0.090 
 
0.050 
 
(-2.53) 
 
(-1.95) (-2.459) 
 
(-2.759) 
 
(0.90) 
 
(0.63) (0.961) 
 
(0.511) 
PFDIFF 
 
0.425*** 0.31*** 
 
0.16 0.046 
 
 
0.034 -0.03 
 
-0.05 -0.078 
  
(4.209) (2.82) 
 
(1.24) (0.352) 
 
 
(0.220) (-0.13) 
 
(-0.22) (-0.284) 
Post*PFDIFF 
 
-0.218 -0.11 
 
0.13 0.246 
 
 
0.149** 0.11 
 
0.21 0.203 
  
(-1.505) (-0.58) 
 
(0.62) (1.046) 
 
 
(2.404) (0.73) 
 
(0.92) (0.801) 
NumSeg -0.04 -0.039 -0.04 0.014 0.01 0.009 
 
-0.12*** -0.114*** -0.13*** -0.044** -0.04** -0.045** 
 
(-0.72) (-0.744) (-0.77) (0.400) (0.37) (0.271) 
 
(-4.69) (-4.930) (-4.73) (-2.221) (-2.26) (-2.297) 
Related 0.02 0.014 0.02 -0.045* -0.04* -0.038* 
 
0.13*** 0.122*** 0.14*** 0.044* 0.04* 0.047* 
 
(0.26) (0.244) (0.31) (-1.835) (-1.78) (-1.700) 
 
(2.83) (3.060) (2.90) (1.696) (1.65) (1.822) 
NumTNICPrs -0.00 -0.000 -0.00 -0.000 -0.00 -0.000 
 
-0.00** -0.001** -0.00** -0.001 -0.00 -0.001 
 
(-1.53) (-1.388) (-1.26) (-0.797) (-0.87) (-0.727) 
 
(-2.38) (-2.535) (-2.37) (-1.127) (-1.05) (-1.044) 
HHI -0.13 -0.107 -0.14 -0.018 0.01 -0.021 
 
0.17 0.181 0.17 0.162 0.17 0.161 
 
(-1.21) (-0.931) (-1.27) (-0.125) (0.04) (-0.140) 
 
(0.84) (0.882) (0.84) (0.991) (1.01) (0.984) 
Size 0.07*** 0.075*** 0.07*** 0.051*** 0.05*** 0.052*** 
 
0.10*** 0.091*** 0.10*** 0.068*** 0.07*** 0.068*** 
 
(5.08) (5.056) (5.22) (3.769) (3.85) (3.898) 
 
(5.82) (5.538) (5.79) (3.450) (3.35) (3.420) 
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Table 5 Panel B (Continued)            
PM 0.41** 0.391* 0.39* 0.467* 0.46* 0.452* 
 
0.23 0.292 0.22 1.909*** 1.94*** 1.901*** 
 
(2.02) (1.896) (1.88) (1.948) (1.86) (1.855) 
 
(0.68) (0.929) (0.67) (3.191) (3.20) (3.145) 
Invest 0.51 0.536 0.55 0.995*** 1.01*** 1.016*** 
 
0.16 0.087 0.16 0.242 0.22 0.229 
 
(1.23) (1.292) (1.32) (3.382) (3.28) (3.339) 
 
(0.34) (0.192) (0.33) (0.362) (0.34) (0.334) 
Leverage 0.17 0.152 0.15 0.016 0.01 0.007 
 
0.47** 0.463** 0.47** 0.244 0.23 0.236 
 
(1.23) (1.095) (1.11) (0.099) (0.06) (0.044) 
 
(2.30) (2.307) (2.29) (1.417) (1.35) (1.369) 
SalesGrow 0.02 0.014 0.03 0.181*** 0.18*** 0.191*** 
 
0.09 0.081 0.09 -0.029 -0.03 -0.028 
 
(0.17) (0.108) (0.20) (3.358) (3.71) (3.758) 
 
(0.76) (0.647) (0.76) (-0.328) (-0.38) (-0.317) 
StdROE 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.008 0.01 0.010 
 
0.01 0.010 0.01 -0.008 -0.01 -0.009 
 
(0.05) (0.041) (0.13) (0.328) (0.34) (0.415) 
 
(0.13) (0.157) (0.14) (-0.170) (-0.15) (-0.199) 
MAR 0.14*** 0.150*** 0.15*** 0.198*** 0.20*** 0.201*** 
 
0.12** 0.124** 0.12** 0.207*** 0.21*** 0.211*** 
 
(4.78) (4.545) (4.73) (8.379) (7.97) (8.107) 
 
(2.10) (2.197) (2.18) (5.110) (5.16) (5.160) 
Corr5yr -0.04 -0.039 -0.04 -0.053* -0.05* -0.052* 
 
-0.03 -0.024 -0.03 -0.023 -0.02 -0.022 
 
(-1.19) (-1.017) (-0.99) (-1.918) (-1.95) (-1.878) 
 
(-0.75) (-0.603) (-0.72) (-0.522) (-0.42) (-0.467) 
Surprise -0.01*** -0.007** -0.01*** -0.009*** -0.01*** -0.008*** 
 
-0.01 -0.011 -0.01 -0.011 -0.01 -0.010 
 
(-2.61) (-2.407) (-2.60) (-4.560) (-4.31) (-4.300) 
 
(-1.25) (-1.283) (-1.26) (-1.410) (-1.40) (-1.377) 
Constant -0.80*** -0.836*** -0.86*** -0.766*** -0.75*** -0.776*** 
 
-0.81*** -0.779*** -0.82*** -0.820*** -0.79*** -0.815*** 
  (-7.80) (-7.923) (-8.15) (-8.570) (-8.24) (-8.492) 
 
(-4.36) (-4.587) (-4.47) (-5.224) (-5.66) (-5.336) 
       
 
      
No. Obs. 1,631 1,631 1,631 1,531 1,531 1,531 
 
665 665 665 607 607 607 
Adj. R2 8.65% 8.59% 9.04% 12.89% 12.65% 13.20% 
 
15.00% 14.42% 14.77% 16.53% 16.49% 16.37% 
This table presents estimation of equation (7).  Panel A provides estimation for firms with no change in segment reporting before and after ASC 280 
implementation, holding constant firm segment reporting quality.  Regressions 1-6 in panel A provide estimation for single segment firms before and after ASC 
280 implementation.  Regressions 7-12 in panel A provide estimation for multi-segment firms with no change in segment reporting before and after ASC 280 
implementation.  Panel B provides estimation for firms with a change in segment reporting before and after ASC 280 implementation. Regressions 1-6 in panel 
B provide estimation for firms changing from single segment to multi-segment reporting.  Regressions 7-12 in panel B provide estimation for firms reporting 
additional segments (multi-segment to more segments than reported under SFAS No. 15).  Variables are defined in appendix B.  Coefficients are reported above, 
t-statistics below in parentheses.  All regressions are estimated using two-way clustering by firm and year. 
Significance: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, and * p-value <0.1 
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Table 6 
Regressions for ExVal on Segment Reporting Differentiation for Robustness Tests with Controls 
  
Line of Business 
Primary Type 
 
NAICS Codes 
 
Fama & French 48 Industry Codes 
 Multi-Segment  Multi-Segment Single Segment  Multi-Segment Single Segment 
 
ExValRev ExValAT 
 
ExValRev ExValAT ExValRev ExValAT 
 
ExValRev ExValAT ExValRev ExValAT 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) 
             
FFDIFF 0.10*** 0.037 
 
0.09*** 0.080** 0.23*** 0.133*** 
 
0.05 -0.037 0.16*** 0.074** 
 
(2.74) (0.890) 
 
(2.62) (2.230) (9.39) (6.015) 
 
(0.89) (-0.642) (3.19) (2.255) 
PFDIFF 0.19** 0.148** 
 
0.14** 0.116* 0.07 0.103** 
 
0.17* 0.240*** 0.19*** 0.205*** 
 
(2.53) (2.451) 
 
(2.12) (1.957) (1.33) (2.208) 
 
(1.93) (3.036) (3.20) (3.508) 
NumSeg -0.05*** -0.022* 
 
-0.05*** -0.028** 
  
 
-0.04*** -0.021* 
  
 
(-3.87) (-1.850) 
 
(-3.50) (-2.197) 
  
 
(-3.00) (-1.663) 
  
Related 0.05*** 0.019 
 
0.04*** 0.026** 
  
 
0.03** 0.018 
  
 
(3.56) (1.439) 
 
(3.10) (2.100) 
  
 
(2.50) (1.420) 
  
NumTNICPrs 0.00 -0.000 
 
0.00 -0.001** 0.00*** 0.000** 
 
0.00 -0.001** 0.00** 0.000* 
 
(0.27) (-1.210) 
 
(0.33) (-2.180) (2.89) (2.414) 
 
(0.08) (-2.267) (2.00) (1.646) 
HHI 0.18*** 0.042 
 
0.20*** 0.008 0.07 0.014 
 
0.19*** 0.029 0.06 0.017 
 
(2.89) (0.661) 
 
(3.45) (0.144) (1.43) (0.346) 
 
(3.26) (0.459) (1.33) (0.438) 
Size 0.06*** 0.039*** 
 
0.06*** 0.037*** 0.08*** 0.043*** 
 
0.06*** 0.036*** 0.08*** 0.042*** 
 
(7.03) (3.767) 
 
(7.32) (3.699) (10.46) (5.265) 
 
(7.12) (3.599) (10.32) (5.270) 
PM 0.46*** 0.443*** 
 
0.43*** 0.486*** 0.12** 0.334*** 
 
0.44*** 0.489*** 0.13** 0.340*** 
 
(4.93) (3.743) 
 
(4.76) (4.105) (2.11) (8.710) 
 
(4.93) (4.169) (2.28) (8.881) 
Invest 0.33 1.213*** 
 
0.28 0.991*** 0.22 0.755*** 
 
0.26 0.975*** 0.18 0.727*** 
 
(1.16) (5.372) 
 
(1.13) (4.060) (1.29) (5.620) 
 
(1.06) (4.060) (1.07) (5.469) 
Leverage 0.16** -0.109 
 
0.16*** -0.096 -0.04 -0.060 
 
0.16*** -0.094 -0.04 -0.063 
 
(2.47) (-1.476) 
 
(2.77) (-1.424) (-1.01) (-1.355) 
 
(2.90) (-1.402) (-1.14) (-1.421) 
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Table 6 (Continued)            
SalesGrow 0.01 -0.015 
 
0.02 -0.013 0.09*** 0.138*** 
 
0.02 -0.014 0.09*** 0.138*** 
 
(0.37) (-0.707) 
 
(0.55) (-0.623) (2.93) (6.380) 
 
(0.52) (-0.668) (3.04) (6.735) 
StdROE -0.01 0.014 
 
-0.00 0.018** 0.01 0.024*** 
 
-0.00 0.018* 0.00 0.023*** 
 
(-1.20) (1.335) 
 
(-0.49) (1.987) (1.20) (4.983) 
 
(-0.53) (1.947) (0.95) (4.792) 
MAR 0.14*** 0.218*** 
 
0.14*** 0.205*** 0.14*** 0.185*** 
 
0.14*** 0.204*** 0.13*** 0.183*** 
 
(6.11) (10.014) 
 
(6.21) (8.853) (6.15) (11.413) 
 
(6.14) (8.882) (5.85) (10.901) 
Corr5yr -0.06*** -0.084*** 
 
-0.05*** -0.053*** -0.04*** -0.035** 
 
-0.05*** -0.054*** -0.04*** -0.037*** 
 
(-4.18) (-5.362) 
 
(-3.26) (-3.140) (-3.02) (-2.546) 
 
(-3.25) (-3.122) (-3.31) (-2.728) 
Surprise -0.01*** -0.010***  -0.01*** -0.011*** -0.01*** -0.010***  -0.01*** -0.011*** -0.01*** -0.011*** 
 (-3.50) (-7.408)  (-3.89) (-8.112) (-10.06) (-11.015)  (-3.99) (-8.217) (-10.89) (-11.622) 
Constant -0.82*** -0.584*** 
 
-0.84*** -0.534*** -0.85*** -0.666*** 
 
-0.81*** -0.513*** -0.78*** -0.627*** 
  (-12.52) (-7.716) 
 
(-13.34) (-7.074) (-15.14) (-12.171) 
 
(-13.15) (-7.229) (-14.05) (-11.846) 
   
 
    
 
    
No. Obs. 9,706 8,057 
 
11,491 9,705 14,027 15,019 
 
11,491 9,705 14,027 15,019 
Adj. R2 7.41% 9.98% 
 
6.75% 8.95% 9.92% 13.68% 
 
6.54% 8.87% 8.67% 13.09% 
This table presents estimation of equation (6) for robustness tests.  Variables are defined in appendix B.  Regressions 1-2 eliminate firms for which 
geographic segments are their primary segment reporting type.  Regressions 3-6 change the industry code for comparison between the focal firm and the 
industry core operations portfolio to NAICS codes.  Regressions 7-10 change the industry code for comparison between the focal firm and the industry 
core operations portfolio to Fama & French 48 Industry codes.  Coefficients are reported above, t-statistics below in parentheses.  All regressions are 
estimated using two-way clustering by firm and year. 
Significance: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, and * p-value <0.1 
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Table 7 
Regressions of ExVal on Segment Reporting Differentiation,  
a Variable for Small Differentiating Segments & Controls 
 ExValRev ExValAT 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FFDIFF 0.15*** 
 
0.12*** 0.097*** 
 
0.077** 
 
(4.59) 
 
(3.74) (2.663) 
 
(2.084) 
PFDIFF 
 
0.197*** 0.14** 
 
0.13** 0.099* 
  
(3.017) (2.13) 
 
(2.41) (1.770) 
SmallSeg 1.04*** 
 
1.04*** 0.481* 
 
0.487* 
 
(3.63) 
 
(3.63) (1.648) 
 
(1.686) 
NumSeg -0.07*** -0.040*** -0.07*** -0.035*** -0.02* -0.036*** 
 
(-4.77) (-3.105) (-4.84) (-2.768) (-1.78) (-2.827) 
Related 0.06*** 0.034*** 0.06*** 0.031** 0.02 0.033*** 
 
(4.36) (2.707) (4.51) (2.515) (1.62) (2.658) 
NumTNICPrs 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.001** -0.00** -0.001** 
 
(0.06) (0.328) (0.27) (-2.442) (-2.23) (-2.301) 
HHI 0.19*** 0.216*** 0.19*** 0.008 0.03 0.007 
 
(3.36) (3.779) (3.28) (0.143) (0.49) (0.123) 
Size 0.06*** 0.061*** 0.06*** 0.037*** 0.04*** 0.037*** 
 
(7.48) (7.207) (7.50) (3.685) (3.60) (3.679) 
PM 0.43*** 0.432*** 0.42*** 0.491*** 0.49*** 0.484*** 
 
(4.89) (4.850) (4.77) (4.116) (4.13) (4.072) 
Invest 0.29 0.280 0.31 0.978*** 0.98*** 0.996*** 
 
(1.17) (1.147) (1.27) (3.992) (4.01) (4.073) 
Leverage 0.16*** 0.160*** 0.16*** -0.088 -0.09 -0.095 
 
(2.90) (2.815) (2.73) (-1.305) (-1.38) (-1.420) 
SalesGrow 0.02 0.019 0.02 -0.016 -0.01 -0.014 
 
(0.45) (0.543) (0.51) (-0.740) (-0.67) (-0.668) 
StdROE -0.00 -0.003 -0.00 0.017* 0.02** 0.018** 
 
(-0.59) (-0.441) (-0.47) (1.911) (1.98) (1.977) 
MAR 0.14*** 0.140*** 0.14*** 0.204*** 0.20*** 0.205*** 
 
(6.21) (6.236) (6.38) (8.825) (8.88) (8.907) 
Corr5yr -0.05*** -0.051*** -0.05*** -0.052*** -0.05*** -0.052*** 
 
(-3.16) (-3.315) (-3.20) (-3.121) (-3.21) (-3.137) 
Surprise -0.01*** -0.007*** -0.01*** -0.011*** -0.01*** -0.011*** 
 (-3.75) (-3.981) (-3.76) (-7.912) (-8.32) (-7.958) 
Constant -0.81*** -0.831*** -0.83*** -0.504*** -0.52*** -0.518*** 
  (-12.94) (-13.293) (-13.15) (-6.692) (-6.87) (-6.793) 
       
Number of 
observations 
11,491 11,491 11,491 9,705 9,705 9,705 
Adj. R-Squared 6.99% 6.67% 7.12% 8.87% 8.79% 8.95% 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
This table presents the estimation of equation (6) with an additional variable for differentiating 
segments that are less than 10% of sales, SmallSeg.  All other variables are defined in appendix B.  By 
definition SmallSeg firms must have more than one segment.  Thus, regressions 1-6 are estimated for 
only multi-segment firms.  Coefficients are reported above, t-statistics below in parentheses.  All 
regressions are estimated using two-way clustering by firm and year. 
Significance: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, and * p-value <0.1 
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Table 8 
Regressions of ExVal on Segment Reporting Differentiation  
& Controls Split by Median Industry Concentration 
Panel A: ExValRev 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Q1HHI * 
FFDIFF 
0.14* 
 
0.10 
   
0.13 
 
(1.65) 
 
(1.17) 
   
(1.48) 
Q3HHI * 
FFDIFF  
-0.145** -0.12* 
   
-0.17** 
  
(-2.090) (-1.69) 
   
(-2.31) 
FFDIFF 0.12*** 0.189*** 0.17*** 
   
0.16*** 
 
(3.24) (4.954) (3.75) 
   
(3.32) 
Q1HHI * 
PFDIFF    
-0.096 
 
-0.020 -0.13 
    
(-0.739) 
 
(-0.156) (-1.02) 
Q3HHI * 
PFDIFF     
0.18** 0.169* 0.26*** 
     
(2.00) (1.938) (2.85) 
PFDIFF 
   
0.214*** 0.13* 0.136* 0.06 
    
(3.008) (1.88) (1.853) (0.72) 
Q1HHI -0.08** 
 
-0.08** -0.026 
 
-0.041 -0.07* 
 
(-2.36) 
 
(-2.25) (-0.754) 
 
(-1.220) (-1.77) 
Q3HHI 
 
0.104*** 0.10*** 
 
0.03 0.035 0.06* 
  
(2.957) (2.91) 
 
(0.95) (1.199) (1.77) 
NumSeg -0.05*** -0.047*** -0.05*** -0.040*** -0.04*** -0.039*** -0.05*** 
 
(-3.56) (-3.629) (-3.62) (-3.094) (-3.08) (-3.075) (-3.66) 
Related 0.04*** 0.041*** 0.04*** 0.033*** 0.03*** 0.032*** 0.04*** 
 
(3.15) (3.257) (3.20) (2.662) (2.65) (2.609) (3.29) 
NumTNICPrs 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 
 
(0.90) (0.318) (1.06) (0.727) (0.19) (0.716) (1.03) 
HHI 0.20*** 0.101 0.08 0.203*** 0.09 0.070 0.08 
 
(3.40) (1.530) (1.25) (3.483) (1.36) (1.085) (1.31) 
Size 0.06*** 0.063*** 0.06*** 0.062*** 0.06*** 0.062*** 0.06*** 
 
(7.47) (7.394) (7.50) (7.228) (7.19) (7.240) (7.50) 
PM 0.44*** 0.438*** 0.44*** 0.436*** 0.43*** 0.435*** 0.44*** 
 
(4.97) (4.874) (4.94) (4.905) (4.84) (4.902) (4.85) 
Invest 0.34 0.273 0.33 0.309 0.25 0.291 0.34 
 
(1.37) (1.105) (1.33) (1.259) (1.03) (1.185) (1.36) 
Leverage 0.17*** 0.160*** 0.17*** 0.164*** 0.16*** 0.161*** 0.16*** 
 
(2.94) (2.810) (2.91) (2.848) (2.73) (2.794) (2.68) 
SalesGrow 0.02 0.018 0.02 0.018 0.02 0.018 0.02 
 
(0.45) (0.502) (0.45) (0.518) (0.55) (0.526) (0.49) 
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Table 8 Panel A (Continued)     
StdROE -0.00 -0.004 -0.00 -0.004 -0.00 -0.004 -0.00 
 
(-0.55) (-0.509) (-0.54) (-0.466) (-0.42) (-0.450) (-0.37) 
MAR 0.14*** 0.140*** 0.14*** 0.141*** 0.14*** 0.141*** 0.14*** 
 
(6.17) (6.121) (6.13) (6.212) (6.20) (6.191) (6.24) 
Corr5yr -0.05*** -0.050*** -0.05*** -0.050*** -0.05*** -0.050*** -0.05*** 
 
(-3.13) (-3.273) (-3.20) (-3.277) (-3.29) (-3.247) (-3.18) 
Surprise -0.01*** -0.007*** -0.01*** -0.007*** -0.01*** -0.007*** -0.01*** 
 
(-3.81) (-3.875) (-3.93) (-4.024) (-3.99) (-4.053) (-3.90) 
Constant -0.84*** -0.838*** -0.85*** -0.839*** -0.81*** -0.816*** -0.85*** 
  (-13.22) (-13.071) (-12.98) (-13.153) (-12.50) (-12.440) (-12.87) 
No. Obs. 11,491 11,491 11,491 11,491 11,491 11,491 11,491 
Adj. R2 6.88% 6.93% 7.01% 6.70% 6.79% 6.82% 7.27% 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Regressions of ExVal on Segment Reporting Differentiation  
& Controls Split by Median Industry Concentration 
Panel B: ExValAT 
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        
Q1HHI * 
FFDIFF 
0.089 
 
0.091 
   
0.115 
 
(1.274) 
 
(1.264) 
   
(1.498) 
Q3HHI * 
FFDIFF  
-0.02 0.001 
   
-0.038 
  
(-0.29) (0.008) 
   
(-0.454) 
FFDIFF 0.082* 0.10** 0.081 
   
0.073 
 
(1.944) (2.47) (1.618) 
   
(1.361) 
Q1HHI * 
PFDIFF    
-0.11 
 
-0.03 -0.110 
    
(-1.04) 
 
(-0.34) (-1.005) 
Q3HHI * 
PFDIFF     
0.185* 0.17* 0.197* 
     
(1.784) (1.67) (1.796) 
PFDIFF 
   
0.15** 0.063 0.07 0.040 
    
(2.40) (1.103) (1.11) (0.551) 
Q1HHI -0.057 
 
-0.059 -0.01 
 
-0.02 -0.048 
 
(-1.436) 
 
(-1.548) (-0.24) 
 
(-0.55) (-1.157) 
Q3HHI 
 
0.03 0.029 
 
-0.013 -0.01 -0.002 
  
(0.75) (0.675) 
 
(-0.358) (-0.23) (-0.055) 
NumSeg -0.026** -0.03** -0.026** -0.02* -0.022* -0.02* -0.027** 
 
(-2.037) (-2.06) (-2.037) (-1.78) (-1.762) (-1.76) (-2.104) 
Related 0.024* 0.02* 0.024* 0.02 0.020 0.02 0.025** 
 
(1.860) (1.92) (1.852) (1.60) (1.571) (1.54) (1.965) 
NumTNICPrs -0.000 -0.00** -0.000 -0.00 -0.001** -0.00 -0.000 
 
(-1.444) (-2.28) (-1.366) (-1.54) (-2.337) (-1.56) (-1.390) 
HHI 0.013 -0.03 -0.042 0.02 -0.024 -0.03 -0.039 
 
(0.213) (-0.50) (-0.664) (0.33) (-0.371) (-0.54) (-0.622) 
Size 0.037*** 0.04*** 0.037*** 0.04*** 0.035*** 0.04*** 0.037*** 
 
(3.874) (3.69) (3.902) (3.77) (3.589) (3.77) (3.874) 
PM 0.495*** 0.49*** 0.495*** 0.49*** 0.485*** 0.49*** 0.486*** 
 
(4.116) (4.09) (4.081) (4.13) (4.132) (4.14) (4.040) 
Invest 1.016*** 0.97*** 1.011*** 0.99*** 0.955*** 0.97*** 1.010*** 
 
(4.232) (3.97) (4.195) (4.15) (3.887) (4.07) (4.197) 
Leverage -0.085 -0.09 -0.085 -0.09 -0.093 -0.09 -0.095 
 
(-1.255) (-1.33) (-1.263) (-1.37) (-1.409) (-1.38) (-1.421) 
SalesGrow -0.016 -0.02 -0.016 -0.01 -0.013 -0.01 -0.015 
 
(-0.737) (-0.72) (-0.751) (-0.71) (-0.651) (-0.68) (-0.683) 
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Table 8 Panel B (Continued)      
StdROE 0.017* 0.02* 0.017* 0.02** 0.018** 0.02* 0.018* 
 
(1.902) (1.92) (1.897) (1.97) (1.961) (1.96) (1.954) 
MAR 0.204*** 0.20*** 0.204*** 0.20*** 0.204*** 0.20*** 0.205*** 
 
(8.791) (8.78) (8.761) (8.81) (8.849) (8.81) (8.796) 
Corr5yr -0.052*** -0.05*** -0.052*** -0.05*** -0.054*** -0.05*** -0.051*** 
 
(-3.087) (-3.13) (-3.098) (-3.18) (-3.180) (-3.17) (-3.054) 
Surprise -0.011*** -0.01*** -0.011*** -0.01*** -0.011*** -0.01*** -0.011*** 
 
(-8.086) (-7.93) (-8.006) (-8.41) (-8.225) (-8.33) (-8.044) 
Constant -0.522*** -0.51*** -0.519*** -0.52*** -0.497*** -0.50*** -0.520*** 
  (-6.992) (-6.89) (-7.040) (-7.05) (-6.451) (-6.62) (-6.873) 
No. Obs. 9,705 9,705 9,705 9,705 9,705 9,705 9,705 
Adj. R2 8.86% 8.82% 8.86% 8.80% 8.86% 8.87% 9.04% 
This table presents estimation of equation (6) with two additional indicator variables.  Q3HHI is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year observation is above third quartile HHI in for the year, 
zero otherwise.  Q1HHI is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm year observation is below the 
first quartile HHI for the year, zero otherwise.  Regressions 1-14 are estimates for multi-segment firms.  
Regressions 1-7 use ExValRev as the dependent variable.  Regressions 8-14 use ExValAT as the 
dependent variable.  All remaining variables are defined in appendix B.  Coefficients are reported 
above, t-statistics below in parentheses.  All regressions are estimated using two-way clustering by 
firm and year. 
Significance: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, and * p-value <0.1 
 
